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INTRODUCTION

Over the past two decades a fierce debate has raged between proponents of tradable
emission rights and advocates of command-and-control mechanisms for regulating
pollution. To the extent that the two sides have confronted each other's arguments,
the battleground has been distinctly utilitarian-each side argues that its favored
method for controlling pollution entails lower transaction costs, relatively simple and
vigilant enforcement, and superior control over the damage created by pollution.' But
opponents of tradable emissions regimes have also marshaled a normative argument
in attacking those regimes. They have suggested that emissions trading amounts to
the government granting firms or individuals a "right to pollute." These property
regimes transform what was formerly a fine for noncompliance with the law into a
simple charge for using a common resource. Many environmentalists and scholars
find this outcome so perverse that they declare tradable emissions schemes to be
morally objectionable.2 Not surprisingly, proponents of emissions trading admit that
creating a right to pollute is exactly what their schemes do, but they argue that such
rhetoric is irrelevant; all that matters is that emissions trading constitutes the most
efficient way to control pollution.'
A second group of emissions-trading skeptics has sought to use this norms-based
critique to confront proponents of emissions trading on more utilitarian terms. These
critics argue that the sale of pollution rights undermines the current social sanction
that attaches to excessive emissions, thereby transforming pollution from a social evil
into a neutral commodity.' As a result, social norms against excess pollution-which
currently help encourage voluntary compliance by firms with environmental
requirements, environmental whistle-blowing, and private efforts to enforce laws and
regulations governing pollution-will be weakened. Because ofthese developments,
the cost of enforcing the anti-pollution laws would rise. Backers of emissions trading
seem willing to concede that commodifying pollution rights has an adverse effect on
norms, but argue that the efficiency advantages of transitioning to emissions trading
will offset the increased compliance costs that result from the erosion of social
sanctions against pollution.
This Article questions the notion that creating a right to pollute undermines antipollution norms. I argue for precisely the opposite proposition: Commodification of
pollution rights through an emissions trading regime might well buttress norms
against excess polluting, doing so in ways that will have lasting positive effects on
the ecosystem. In order to make this case, I engage in a comprehensive case study of
a jurisdiction that has, in the past few years, moved from a command-and-control
system to a regime based on the tradable permits model. In this instance, however,
the overburdened resource that is governed by the tradable credits regime is not the
atmosphere, but a highway in a major metropolitan area.

1.See sources cited infranote 268.
2. See infra text accompanying note 273.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 283-84.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 276-78.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 279-82.
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In 1988, prodded by its residents and EPA officials to do something about traffic
congestion on 1-15, the main artery connecting downtown to its northern inland
suburbs, San Diego, California opened a series ofExpress Lanes for the exclusive use
of carpools. The lanes were designed to give commuters incentives to pair up, so as
to take advantage of the quicker, less congested commutes in those lanes.
Unfortunately, few solo commuters changed their driving behavior as a result of the
lanes' creation, and traffic conditions in the main lanes continued to worsen.
Moreover, many solo commuters were so determined to avoid the congested main
lanes that they regularly risked stiff fines by driving in the carpool lanes. By 1996 a
desperate city launched a radical pilot program (dubbed "FasTrak") to help contain
the traffic congestion problem. Access to the 1-15 Express Lanes was made available
to solo drivers willing to pay a fee.
In a 1997 article attacking a proposal to implement tradable emissions permits
on the global level, Michael Sandel invoked the specter of this highway-pricing
pilot program to illustrate the dangers of creating a right to pollute:
In effacing the distinction between a fine and a fee, emission trading is like a
recent proposal to open carpool lanes on . . . freeways to drivers without
passengers who are willing to pay a fee. Such drivers are now fined for slipping
into carpool lanes; under the market proposal, they would enjoy a quicker
commute without opprobrium."
As Sandel's analysis implies, the San Diego FasTrak system presents an interesting
opportunity to test the arguments against emissions trading. In San Diego, the
government took an activity that was formerly discouraged-solo driving-and
allowed solo drivers to avoid the penalty of having to wait in rush hour traffic in
exchange for a price.7 It converted an activity that was formerly forbidden (solo
drivers using the Express Lanes) and made it permissible for those willing to pay a
fee that roughly corresponded to the market price of using the relevant resource.'
Sandel's analogy notwithstanding, doesn't it make more sense to study the effects
of emissions trading itself on environmental norms, rather than analogizing to
commodification of the highways? Not really. The FasTrak program represents a
superior case study to test the effects of commodification on norms in that public
awareness of the program is very high.9 The FasTrak program is quite visible and,
withii! its first year of operation, had become well-engrained in the psyches of San
Diego commuters.' By contrast, the fact that the American government has begun

6. Michael J. Sandel, Editorial, It's Immoral To Buy the Right To Pollute, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 1997, at A23. Sandel is the only scholar other than I to note in print the connection
between emissions trading and selling access to carpool lanes, and his treatment of the subject
is entirely encapsulated in the paragraph reproduced in the text.
7. This is the flip side of saying that the government favored carpoolers by allowing them
speedier commutes than solo drivers.
8. In this instance the market price was mediated by the government. Note, however, that
the price of accessing the Express Lanes increased as more drivers sought to do likewise-just
as market prices for any commodity should increase when the number of buyers rises and the
quantity of the product remains constant. See infra note 111.
9. See infra text accompanying note 289.
10. See infra text accompanying note 113.
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to use a tradable emissions scheme to govern S02 emissions has yet to register with
the public. Thus, a major impediment to studying the effect of law on social
norms-lack of awareness of the law's provisions--does not arise in the San Diego
case study. Moreover, by focusing on a discrete set of norms within a single
community, it is much easier to isolate the influence of a government program on
norms governing a single activity--driving. In a larger community-such as the
nation as a whole--there are likely to be a number of confounding variables that will
influence environmental norms that operate independently of any government
program.
Sandel invoked the example of selling access to the carpool lanes to make a
particular point. He thought it intuitive that the FasTrak approach would undermine
the effectiveness of San Diego's efforts to encourage carpooling. His prediction may
have been intuitive, but it was dead wrong. Much to the delight of San Diego city
planners, the number ofcarpoolerson I-15 increasedsignificantlyafterFasTrakwas
implemented. Two other results of the San Diego experiment should surprise Sandel
and the opponents of commodification: First, the percentage of unauthorizedusers
in the ExpressLanes droppednoticeably.Second, the equity critiqueofcommodifying
roadwayaccess-thatit unfairlyadvantagesthe wealthy-didnot resonatewithin the
community. This Article's ambition is to explain these three surprising findings and
apply the lessons'learned to the larger legal question of how changes in the law
influence social norms, with a particular emphasis on the norms governing
pollution."

I1. In this Article I define norms as patterns of behavior that are widely adhered to by some
group of individuals, at least in part because of social pressures to conform to that norm.
Taboos against adultery, smoking in a no-smoking area, the use of profanity when children are
present, and failing to wash one's hands after using a restroom are examples of norms. So are
affirmative practices such as the American practice of shaking hands, the Japanese practice of
bowing, the exchanging of pleasantries at the start of a job interview, and the reliance of
American lawyers on Latin phraseology. Norms can be distinguished from other forms of
human behavior that are widely adhered to for reasons having nothing to do with social
pressures. For example, everyone squints when exposed to bright sunlight, and many people
snore while sleeping, but these practices are due to biological pressures, as opposed to social
ones. Note that with the ultimate example, as various technological gizmos designed to control
snoring are developed and marketed, a social norm againstsnoring by those who do not sleep
alone may gradually emerge.
Of course, norms have two components: Norms both describe how people do behave and
dictate how, according to the relevant community's standards, they should behave. In this
Article some of the phenomena I have described as being norm-driven will perhaps cause some
readers to bristle. For example, I refer to a "norm" of solo commuting, even though most solo
commuters understand that society would be better off if they instead adhered to a carpooling
norm. But the decision to drive solo is largely dictated by social pressures, such as the
arrangement of work schedules, notions about the value of privacy and solitude, decisions
about where to live, and automobile advertising, to give a few examples. Consumer preferences
for certain types of products and behaviors can become norms precisely because those
preferences are heavily shaped by factors exogenous to the individual consumer. And there is
nothing contradictory about pointing to conflicts among norms governing how people should
behave and do behave or recognizing thatpowerful, contradictory norms often send individuals
mixed messages about how they should behave. Nor does it stretch the concept of norms too
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Part I introduces the theoretical framework for the two approaches to traffic
management combined by the FasTrak program. It explores why American drivers
are attached to solo commuting, and ways in which cities have tried to encourage
motorists to consider carpooling. Part I then briefly discusses congestion pricing, an
approach that seeks to decrease congestion by charging motorists tolls that vary based
on the levels of traffic congestion at a given time. Part II examines the factors leading
San Diego to adopt its pilot program and reviews the initial data on the program's
success in decreasing traffic congestion and violations of the laws against
unauthorized use of the Express Lanes. Part III discusses how the program's
implementation affected norms on 1-15. Specifically, the effect on norms governing
which types of commuting behavior are most appropriate, the effect on norms
concerning the acceptability of breaking the law, and the effect on egalitarian norms
regarding roadway access are examined. Part IV highlights the general legal literature
on norm creation, with an emphasis on how legal changes prompt changes in popular
norms. It then uses the lessons learned from the San Diego case study to help address
fundamental questions about what effect a shift to emissions trading regimes in the
pollution-regulation context is likely to have on pollution-related norms. A brief
conclusion in Part V summarizes the Article's more interesting findings and points
out how the lessons of San Diego apply to current debates over commodification in
property law, environmental law, and bioethics.

I. CARPOOLS AND CONGESTION:
A

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. Carpools
Robert Putnam is the leading modem theorist of social capital in the United States.
In comparing America of the 1950s to today's society, Putnam notes the extent to
which people who bowl have, over the past few decades, ceased participating in
bowling leagues, preferring to bowl in smaller groups or even by themselves.' He
sees this dynamic as symptomatic of a trend away from community organizations as
Americans become increasingly withdrawn and uses the bowling dynamic as the title
for his article on the broader phenomenon entitled Bowling Alone.
During the same period of time, American drivers have been taking a cue from
their bowling counterparts. Americans are now driving alone at unprecedented14
levels. 3 As middle-class families have come to own two, three, or even more cars,

far to say that norms are behavioral patterns that influence decisional matrices as seemingly
different as how ranchers resolve cattle disputes and how parents decide to meet their families'
transportation needs.
12. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 65 (1995). Putnam recently released a book with the same title. See ROBERT D.
PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
13. See Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong?, 17

STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 141, 163-64 (1998) (noting that vehicle occupancy dropped from 1.3
passengers per vehicle in 1977 and 1983 to 1.1 in 1990, and that "four million fewer workers
carpooled in 1990 than in 1980"); U.S, Census Bureau, Means of Transportationto Workfor
the U.S. (visited May 23,2000) <http:/wvw.census.gov/population/socdemo/oumeymode67
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driving has become an increasingly solitary experience. The early 1980s saw a
particularly sharp increase in the percentage of Americans who drive to work alone. 5
By 1990, the average car commuting to or from work in the United States contained
only 1.09 occupants. 6
The solo driver in his car has become an expression of American individualism, a
symbol of freedom and liberation. 7 Peter Freund and George Martin's work aptly
characterizes the current popular psyche:
Ironically, it has also been argued that in a society in which self-control is so
pervasively necessary, the auto may function as one of the last "free spaces," a
means of freedom and refuge from civilization. Resistance to mass transit or to car
pooling may come partly from the fact that "car time" for many people is one of
the only occasions that they can be alone for an appreciable length of time."
Driving has become less of an opportunity for interactions with family members, coworkers, and neighbors, and more of a space for an individual to collect his thoughts,
and escape from his family members, co-workers, and neighbors. 9
From an environmentalist perspective, as well as a city planning perspective, the
growth of single occupant vehicles ("SOVs") is certainly harmful. The prevalence of
SOVs on American roads, especially during rush-hour commutes, has contributed

90.txt> (noting that the percentage of workers carpooling to work declined from 19.7% in 1980
to 13.4% in 1990).
14. See generallyJOHN F. KAIN, THE IMPACTS OF CONGESTION PRICING ON TRANSITAND
CARPOOL DEMAND AND SUPPLY 29 tbl.7 (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research Discussion Paper
No. 1643, 1993) (collecting data showing that in 1990 the majority of households in heavily
congested major metropolitan areas owned two or more cars). There are a number of other
reasons explaining the rise in solo driving. For a full exploration, see Oren, supra note 13, at
160-74.
15. See PETER FREUND &GEORGE MARTIN, THE ECOLOGYOFTHE AUTOMOBILE 9 (1993).
16. See U.S. Census Bureau, supranote 13; see also CHARLES L. WRIGHT, FAST WHEELS,
SLOWTRAFFIC: URBANTRANSPORT CHOICES 37-38 (1992) (quoting an earlier figure of 1.15).
See generallyKAIN, supranote 14, at 29 tbl.7 (noting that in the nation's most congested urban
areas [excluding New York City] almost 73% of all trips to work are in single occupant
vehicles, versus 11% in carpools, and less than 9% on mass transit).
17. See FREUND & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 82, 86; see also Len Holden, More Than a
Marque. The Caras Symbol: Aspects of Culturein the 20th Century, in THE MOTOR CARAND
POPULAR CULTUREINTHE 20TH CENTURY 28,29 (David Thoms et al. eds., 1998) (noting that
the car's "widespread use in film and literature as a metaphor for freedom, of 'moving on' and
starting over is reflective of individualism and the need for control overone's destiny, concepts
powerful in the West especially in the USA").
18. FREUND & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 99.
19. This interest in escaping helps explain why so many Americans are resistant to using
mass transit. As Charles Wright has observed, "few people are attracted to transit for the
opportunity it affords them to meet strangers." WRIGHT, supra note 16, at 116.
From a communitarian point of view, it is debatable whether the atomization of driving
experiences is a good or a bad thing. The community-building possibilities for carpooling
should not be discounted. See Richard Simon & Geoff Boucher, Foes of CarpoolLanes Get
New Ammunition, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1998, at Al ("There also are stories about how
carpooling led to romances-and even the reunion of two long-lost sisters.").
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significantly to the traffic congestion that plagues many urban neighborhoods.2"
"Some 70 percent of all urban interstates are congested during rushhours."'2' By some
estimates, traffic congestion results in a drain on the American economy equal to
$168 billion 1990 dollars?"These costs largely result from delays in people and
goods reaching their intended destinations. More congested roads also increase the
frequency of vehicular collisions.' The environmental effects of congestion on the
roadways are significant as well. Idling in traffic results in significant emissions of
greenhouse gasses and other forms of pollution.24
At the risk of stating the obvious, congestion is a significant cause of citizen
frustration. While solo drivers are often supportive of increased spending for mass
transit programs as a means of easing congestion,' they resist using mass transit and
participating in carpools themselves. For many people, the costs of organizing and
participating in carpools are prohibitive: It is often difficult for commuters to find
workers with similar routes, coordinate work schedules, agree on travel routes and
times, and arrange for backup transportation in the event of unanticipated events at
work. 26 As a result of these costs, the average driver is very supportive of efforts to

20. Cf KENNETH A. SMALL, URBAN TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS 151 (1992)
("Carpooling provides flexible service with far less use of highway infrastructure and parking
facilities than solo driver [sic].").
21. Robert W. Poole, Jr., PrivateTollRoads, in PRIVATIZING TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
165, 166 (Simon Hakim et al. eds., 1996); see also KENNETH A. SMALL ET AL., ROAD WORK:
ANEW HIGHWAY PRICINGAND INVESTMENT POLICY 80-81 (1989) (providing additional data
on increasing levels of metropolitan road congestion).
22. See Charles Komanoff, PollutionTaxesfor Roadway Transportation,12 PACEENVTL.
L. REV. 121, 129 (1994).
23. See id.at 133. Of course, when cars moving slowly in bumper to bumpertraffic collide,
the damage is less likely to be severe (and costly) than when cars moving at high speeds

collide.
24. See Thomas 0. McGarity, RegulatingCommuters To Clearthe Air: Some Difficulties
in Implementing a NationalProgramat the Local Level, 27 PAC. L.J. 1521, 1526-28 (1996);
Tirza S. Wahrman, Breaking the Logjam: The PeakPricingof Congested Urban Roadways
Underthe Clean Air Act To Improve Air Qualityand Reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled,8 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 181, 196 (1998).

25. See, e.g., Cheryl Crabb, Poll Respondents Cite Mass Transit, Road Widening and
BuildingBan as Solutions,ATLANTA J. & CONsT., Jan. 21, 1999, at 04JH (reporting that 67%

of north Atlanta suburban residents support increased spending on mass transit, as opposed to
31% prefering road widening as a means of combating traffic congestion, despite the fact that
90% of the residents commute to work alone); Erik Kriss, Public: Term Limits, No Parole:
New York Voters Send a Message in the Latest Statewide Poll, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse),
June 30, 1998, at Al (reporting that New York residents support increased spending on mass
transit), availablein 1998 WL 4365086; see also PETER D. HART RESEARCH ASSocS., U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., A SURVEY OF AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOwARD TRANSPORTATION 35
(1978) (noting that over 70% of those in major metropolitan areas favored increased spending
on mass transit); Komanoff, supranote 22, at 134 (providing similar data from the UK).
26. See PETER SAMUEL, How To "BUILD OUR VAY OUT OF CONGESTION": INNOVATIVE
APPROACHES TO EXPANDING URBAN HIGHWAY CAPACITY 4 (Reason Pub. Pol'y Inst. No. 250,
1999); Craig N. Oren, How a Mandate Camefrom Hell: The Making of the FederalEmployee
Trip Reduction Program,28 ENVTL. L. 267, 297 (1998); see also FREUND & MARTIN, supra
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get other people out of their SOVs. This somewhat hypocritical stance is partially

explained by the fact that "most drivers see themselves as victims of congestion, not
contributors to it."'2 7 As with many environmental goods, there is a divergence
between expressed citizen preferences (in support ofcarpooling) and actual consumer
behavior.2" Drivers qua citizens prefer that carpooling and mass transit be much more
popular, while drivers qua consumers refuse to cooperate by relying on these methods
of transportation in their own lives. Or perhaps the explanation is even simpler: Solo
drivers are willing to finance programs that encourage carpooling and mass transit as
a way of inducing other drivers to leave the roads so that the remaining solo drivers
will have quicker commutes.
In recent years, city governments have turned to one such program with increasing
frequency: High Occupancy Vehicle ("HOV') lanes. HOV lanes are highway lanes
that are restricted to vehicles carrying more than one passenger. The minimum
number of passengers required to permit a driver to legally drive in an HOV lane
29
varies from road to road, but is usually either two or three, including. the driver.
Because of these restrictions, HOV lanes are less congested than their open-access
counterparts. This lack of congestion is intended to encourage those drivers who
might not otherwise carpool to do so in order to save time and fuel." HOV lanes
became a popular planning tool during the 1970s as a means of encouraging motorists
to conserve fuel during that decade's oil crisis, but their use expanded in the era of
cheaper gasoline as well.3 The federal government also played a major role in
prompting cities to construct carpool lanes through the use of fiscal incentives and
penalties.12 Today, the nation's cities have devoted 800 miles of roadway to carpool

note 15, at 90-91 (noting that men are particularly reluctant to give up their cars).
27. Peter Jones, UrbanRoadPricing:PublicAcceptabilityandBarriersto Implementation,
in ROAD PRICING, TRAFFIC CONGESTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT: ISSUES OF EFFICIENCY AND
SOCIAL FEASIBILITY 263, 265 (Kenneth J. Button & Erik T. Verhoef eds., 1998) [hereinafter
ROAD PRICING]; see also Wahrman, supra note 24, at 196 ("Congestion is a classic negative
externality. As additional road users occupy the road, the quality of service provided to all
users declines.").
28. See generally Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, ConsumerPreferences,CitizenPreferences,

andthe ProvisionofPublicGoods, 108 YALE L.J. 377,378 (1998) (summarizing the literature
on the consumer preferences/citizen preferences split). Lewinsohn-Zamir uses the example of
litterers who nevertheless demand increased funding for environmental protection programs.
See id. at 382.
29. See generally Robert Preer, Commuters Adjusting to Life in the Zipper Lane, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 22, 1998 (South Weekly), at 1 (discussing the controversy in Boston over
whether two-passenger vehicles should be allowed to use the carpool lanes).
30. See Komanoff, supranote 22, at 135; Editorial, HOVs andTrafficJams,COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (Memphis), Dec. 1, 1998, at A8.
31. See Matthew K. Gagelin, Employer Trip Reduction-Who Is Responsible for
Organizingthe Carpool?, 1 ENVTL. LAw. 203 (1994); Carol J. Castaneda, Fear of 'Lexus
Lanes' Unfounded: Fast-Lanefor a Fee Has a BroadAppeal, USA TODAY, Mar. 3, 1997, at
4A.

32. See SAMUEL, supra note 26, at 4; John P. Dwyer, The Practiceof Federalism Under
the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1204 (1995); Gagelin, supra note 31, at 210-11;
Laura Rapacioli, Note & Comment, Be Careful What You Ask for: Attacking the
Constitutionalityof the Clean Air Act OperatingPermit Program, 14 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
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lanes.
Unfortunately, in many areas of the country, HOV lanes have done little to
encourage carpooling. 34 Even though solo commuters can usually glance at the HOV
lanes and see how much faster they might be driving if they picked up another
passenger or two, 35 many are unwilling to change their driving behavior. 6
Commuters who resent the "special treatment" that carpoolers reeeive often fail to
recognize that they themselves could receive such treatment by becoming
carpoolers. 37 In other words, the thought of carpooling never occurs to these drivers.
And with an increasing percentage of commuters driving from their residence in one
suburb to their place of employment in another suburb, it is becoming more difficult
for would-be carpoolers to locate individuals with compatible commuting routes.38
Further, in the words of one commentator, "HOV lanes have proven to be stalking

323, 334-36 (1996).
33. See Debra J. Saunders, Editorial, GridlockWill Set You Free?,S.F. CHRON., Mar. 23,
1999, at A19, availablein 1999 WL 2682878.
34. See, e.g., Oren, supranote 13, at 147; Simon & Boucher, supra note 19, at Al ("One
carpool lane [in New Jersey] carried as few as 32 vehicles per hour; at times there were as
many law-breaking solo commuters in the lane as carpoolers."); id. ("Gov. Christine Todd
Whitman wrote in a letter to federal officials [that] New Jersey was unable to change the
driving patterns of motorists using the roads."). But see id. ("Caltrans also contends that high
occupancy lanes have encouraged carpooling, noting that Southern California's ride-share rate
has held steady, even as the population has increased and as carpooling has declined
nationally."); id.("The Foothill Freeway carries up to 1,800 vehicles per hour in the carpool
lane during the peak period-so many that carpoolers often slow to about 45 mph during rush
hour. Each of the two elevated carpool lanes on the Harbor Freeway, opened last year, carry
up to 1,400 vehicles per hour during peak periods.").
35. See Angela Paik, Life in the Fast Lane, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Oct. 25,

1998, atAl, availablein 1998 WL 6160794 ("'Ifyou drive this every day, you have to see the
people whizzing by you in these [HOV] lanes, and I'd imagine that'd be a pretty big selling
point to go and get a partner to ride to work with."') (alteration in original) (quoting State
Trooper Tim Confroy).
36. See From the Drivers'Pointof View, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), June 24, 1998, at 12,

availablein 1998 WL 3425505 (reprinting comments from motorists who are furious about
the underutilization of New Jersey's HOV lanes and congestion of the general purpose lanes);
Preer, supra note 29, at 1 (quoting a state representative who reports that he has "heard from
a number of people who experience frustration when they are in the other lanes and they look
over and see it empty"). But see Paik, supra note 35, at Al.
These new HOV lanes probably will lead to more "slugging," a bizarre hybrid of
car-pooling that accounts for about 10 percent of all trips on 1-95's HOV lanes.
Every afternoon, commuters in suits line up in the shadow of the Washington
Monument to catch free rides home. Solo drivers stop to fill up their cars with
these "slugs" so they can get access to uncongested HOV lanes.
Id.
37. See generally GODBE RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, Focus GROUP RESEARCH FOR 1-15
COmmurERs (1998), availablein (visited May 23, 2000) <http://www.sandag.cog.ca.us/data
services/fastrak/pdfs/report2.pdf> (collecting comments from motorists who are infuriated by
the underutilization of New Jersey's HOV lanes, which they perceive as a waste of scarce
highway space).
38. See Simon & Boucher, supra note 19, at Al.

1240

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 75:1231

horses for highway expansion. 39 Particularly where the lanes go underutilized, the
environmental harms of constructing these new lanes40 often exceed their benefits.
While it is difficult to deny that HOV lanes do encourage some motorists to carpool,
especially in congested corridors, the question of whether dollars spent on HOV lanes
would be better spent on other efforts to reduce congestion is far from settled.4' That
said, a large number of American city governments remain committed to increasing
carpooling, and view the use ofcarpool lanes as the best way of doing so. This Article
assumes that this goal is a worthy one and analyzes under what circumstances it
might be achieved most effectively.
Given this information, how can one characterize the social norms of commuting?
Any accurate description must account for significant nuance. First, there is a
powerful, dominant42 norm in most American cities that individuals commute to work
in SOVs. I will refer to this pattern of behavior as the solo-commuting norm. This
norm is reinforced by both popular culture (e.g., movie portrayals of the rugged
individualist solo driver)43 and government policy (e.g., gasoline taxes that are much
lower than those prevalent in other developed nations). Second, there is an intensely
held minority norm among many environmentalists and carpoolers holding that
carpooling is morally superior to solo driving,' and that carpoolers are therefore
entitled to receive preferential treatment on the roads in the form of HOV lanes. I will
call this minority norm the carpool missionary norm. Third, there seems to be an
aspirational norm4" among the majority of solo drivers that merges some aspects of

39. Komanoff, supranote 22, at 135; see also Oren, supranote 13, at 218-19 (noting the
reasons why some environmental groups oppose HOV lanes).
40. At least one account suggests that in urban areas the cost of constructing wider
freeways rises exponentially. Thus, an eight-lane highway costs more than twice as much as
a four-lane highway. See A.A. WALTERS, THE ECONOMICS OF ROAD USER CHARGES 184
(1968). But cf David M. Levinson, RoadPricingin Practice,in ROAD PRICING, supra note
27, at 14, 61.
Hence for... the existence of large fixed costs in the presence of indivisibilities,
the technology of road capacity, and the earth moving costs, we can claim that
there are economies of scale associated with the expansion from a two-lane to a
four-lane road. Nevertheless... it is not clear that economies of scale in urban
highway construction exist.
Id.
41. See, e.g., Oren, supranote 13, at 218 ("One study suggests that a network of 344 miles
of HOV lanes in the Washington, D.C. area would reduce trips to work by 2.3%, and that the
modest air quality impact might be offset by the driving required to assemble the carpool.").
42. For a discussion of how different subgroups within a single community can adhere to
competing norms, see infra text accompanying notes 256-59.
43. Indeed, to the extent that these portrayals romanticize the activity of driving alone, they
may push the norm of solo driving in the direction of becoming a solo-commuting norm. But
few, if any, romantic portrayals of the solo driver lionize the solo commuter. Rather, it is the
solo-driving beatnik, adventurer, or traveler who is portrayed flatteringly.
44. See Gagelin, supranote 31, at 246 n.278.
45. My use of the term "aspirational norm" is similar to Howard Margolis's use ofthe same
phrase. See Howard Margolis, EquilibriumNorms, 100 ETHICS 821,833 (1990) ("In their most
fundamental significance, aspirational norms are rules of thumb about what everybody knows
would be socially best .... ).
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these first two patterns of behavior: Many solo drivers are unwilling or feel unable
to abandon solo commuting but recognize that if everyone drives solo, traffic
congestion is likely to become untenable. Therefore, they may support the creation
of HOV lanes even though they doubt that they will derive much benefit from their
creation. This sentiment helps explain why, with the notable exceptions of New
Jersey and Los Angeles, movements to do away with carpool lanes have generally
failed.46 I will refer to this aspirational norm as the "I'd rather be carpooling" norm.
This tripartite system ofbehaviors has interesting implications. First, because ofthe
prevalence of the "I'd rather be carpooling" norm and a general uneasiness about
breaking the law,47 many solo drivers who use the HOV lanes illegally will be
subjected to some internal feelings of guilt, and some level of social peer pressure
(dirty looks, honks from carpoolers, etc.). The people most likely to enforce these
norms vigilantly, however, will be adherents to the carpool missionary norm, 4 who
see themselves as the sole intended beneficiaries of the HOV lanes. Of course, the
fact that drivers on urban freeways are rarely repeat players with nearby automobiles
will lessen social pressure for enforcement. 49 As a means of counteracting this
anonymity problem, some transit authorities have begun to provide phone numbers
that cellular-phone wielding motorists can call to snitch on solo drivers using the
carpool lanes.5 In the Washington, D.C. area, for example, these phone numbers are
accompanied by a catchy slogan encouraging motorists to "Be an HOV Hero. 5 1

46. See generally Oren, supra note 13, at 218-19 (discussing the serious backlash that
occurred when, in the 1970s, the EPA tried to force carpool lanes upon Los Angeles by
converting existing general purpose lanes into carpool lanes); Steve Carney, Car-pool Lane
Rage, L.A. DAILY NEws, Dec. 13, 1999, at 1 (discussing recent opposition to HOV lanes in
California and New Jersey); Paik, supra note 35, at Al ("HOV lanes recently bombed in New
Jersey but are being expanded in Atlanta, Seattle, Dallas and elsewhere.").
47. See infra text accompanying note 238.
48. Cf FRANK WILSON & Assocs., ExPREssPAss PHASE II MARKETING PLAN 7 (1999),

availablein (visited May 12,2000) <http://www.sandag.cog.ca.usdataservices/fastak/pdfs/
mktpln3.pdf>; Paik, supranote 35, at Al.
For patrol officers, the only comic relief comes when commuters try to pass off
mannequins and blow-up dolls as passengers ....
"It's fun when you run into
that. You can take the mannequin out and put it on top of the car while you're
writing the ticket. You'll get a lot of people honking and cheering you on that
way."
IA (quoting State Trooper Tim Confroy).
49. Cf GODBERESEARCH&ANALYSIS, supranote37, at 11 ("Respondents inthepart-time
user group said, 'I think the stiffuess of the fine mitigates against (violation)' and '$271.00 [the
amount of the fine for violation] is the only thing that keeps me from cheating.")
50. In a survey of San Diego commuters, fully 6 out of 10 owned cellular telephones,
pagers, or both. See WILBUR SMITH ASSOCS., BASELINE MARKET SURVEY 12(1996), available
in (visited May 13, 2000) <http://www.sandag.cog.ca.us/dataservicesfastrak/pdfs/task3a.pdf>.
51. Seattle, Washington, has a similar tattle-tale program, but signs along that city's
freeways lack the panache of their D.C. counterparts: Seattle's signs drably read "Report HOV
Violators." An interesting alternative would be to pay whistleblowers a bounty when their tips
to law enforcement result in the issuance of aticket. As Dan Kahan observes, a similar strategy
has been employed in some public schools where guns are rampant. See Dan M. Kahan, Social
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Second, to the extent that the solo-commuting norm is stronger than the "I'd rather
be carpooling" norm, which it certainly is, social norm enforcement will not be
sufficient to deter most individuals from violating the law. The fact that these social
norms against HOV-cheating are not particularly strong requires law enforcement to
take active measures in order to prevent violations. 2 Where those efforts are
nonexistent, the social norm supporting carpooling as a beneficial activity warranting
quicker commutes will erode gradually. That said, the existence of a baseline "I'd
rather be carpooling" norm differentiates HOV lane enforcement from, say,
enforcement of speed limits. With speed limits, few motorists are likely to adhere to
the equivalent of a carpool missionary norm (i.e., speeding is immoral, those who
drive the speed limit are morally entitled to special preferences from the
government),53 and the equivalent "I'd rather be carpooling" norm is particularly

Influence, SocialMeaning, and Deterrence,83 VA. L. REv. 349,364 (1997). Students receive

cash rewards if they provide school officials with information that results in the apprehension
of a gun-toting classmate. See id. Kahan astutely sees this program as an effort not only to
boost compliance with rules against bringing guns to schools, but also to change social norms
concerning gun ownership by students. See id.Whereas machismo norms previously prompted
students to "show off' their guns, the program is designed to make gun ownership more
secretive, and thus less "cool." Id.
52. As Peter Samuel wrote in a recent exchange on the University of Minnesota's
Congestion Pricing List Server:
On the Virginia Bqach HOV in the Tidewater VA region some recent official data
showed more SOVs in the HOV lane in rush hour than HOVs ie a violation rate
over 50 percent. From memory one count was 57 pc violators. The locals have
simply given up on HOV. Top officials there told me they'd tried everything for
5 years and the numbers carpooling just keep dropping and the HOV lanes not
only have fewer vehicles but also fewer passengers than unrestricted lanes and
that is despite almost no enforcement. I guess if they started enforcement now it
would probably kill HOV because of the outcry and because it would reveal the
collapse of real HOV.
Email from Peter Samuel to Con-Price List Serve (Jan. 6, 1999) (on file with author); see also
Carney, supra note 46, at 10 (noting that in New Jersey, prior to the elimination of carpool
lanes along some sections of interstate highways, as many as half the lanes' users were solo
drivers flouting the law); Paik, supra note 35, at Al ("Virginia authorities estimate that 9
percent to 20 percent of all vehicles on HOV lanes don't have the required number of
passengers. Troopers say that-with their other duties-they can't spend much time looking
for violators.").
53. Cf Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Laws, Morals, and Ethics, 19 S.ILL. U. L.J. 447, 456
(1995).

[T]hose who disobey the speeding laws... do not consider themselves oblivious
to community norms. Rather, they believe that the community in practice
recognizes that some ethical norm has "trumped" the legal norm. Most drivers
would say, for example, that driving over the posted speed limit is only
technically wrongful. But they would also say that driving 85 miles an hour
violates the ethics of driving.
Id.; see also Margolis, supra note 45, at 822 (noting that drivers would not be subjected to
scowls from other motorists for driving ten miles over the speed limit when everyone else is
doing the same thing); Michael W. Carroll, Note, When CongressJust Says No: Deterrence
Theory and the InadequateEnforcement of the FederalElection CampaignAct, 84 GEO. L.J.
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weak (while most motorists recognize that higher speeds result in greater loss of
life,54 the majority of drivers speed at least occasionally, and hardly anyone feels
guilty about violating the speed limit),"5 so the need for enforcement of the law by
police officers is paramount.5
B. Congestion-PricingTheory
The late William Vickrey, a Nobel Laureate in Economics, once wrote that "in no
other major area are pricing practices so irrational, so out of date, and so conducive
to waste as in urban transportation. Two aspects are particularly deficient: the absence
of adequate off-peak differentials and the gross underpricing of some modes relative
to others.""7 Vickrey argued that current transportation policy could be improved by
giving drivers greater incentives to drive during hours less prone to congestion and
encouraging those modes of transport that were relatively unlikely to prompt
congestion. In later work Vickrey added a third inefficiency: Current policy made no
distinction between those who valued their time very highly and those with lower
valuations-traffic congestion affected all commuters on a road equally, regardless
of differentials in how desperately they needed to reach their destinations.5 8
Congestion pricing was a scheme developed by Vickrey and others to help correct

551, 568 n. 131 (1996) ("Although speeding currently is punishable by a monetary fine as a
criminal misdemeanor, I assert that the vastmajority ofAmericans would not consider aperson
driving 60 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone to be morally blameworthy. Thus, the
sanction is monetary only because those caught for speeding are not stigmatized.").
54. See, e.g., Stephen H. Burrington, Restoring the Rule of Law and Respect for
Communities in Transportation,5 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 691, 704 (1996) ("Speed kills: the
probability of a pedestrian being killed is 3.5% when a vehicle is traveling at 15 miles per
hour, but increases more than ten-fold to 37% at 31 miles per hour and increases to 83% at 44
miles per hour.").
55. See U.S. DEP'TOFTRANSP., NATIONAL MAXIMUM SPEED LIMIT-FISCAL YEAR 1993:
TRAVEL SPEEDS, ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS, AND SPEED-RELATED HIGHWAY SAFETY

STATISTICS tbl.l (1995); Nikolaus F. Schandlbauer, Comment, Busting the "Fuzzbuster":
Rethinking Bans on RadarDetectors, 94 DICK. L. REV. 783, 783-84 (1990).
56. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Building Bridges and Overcoming Barricades:
Exploringthe Limits ofLaw as anAgent ofTransformationalSocialChange, 47 CASE W.REs.
L.REV. 423, 424 n.3 (1997).
Lowering the speed limit to 55 miles per hour... did not alter the usual driving
habits of most motorists. Moreover, many state highway patrol officers did not
strictly enforce the speed limit, generally affording motorists a zone of
administrative grace of between five and nine miles per hour. Thus, Congress'
attempt to alter the driving habits of the American public failed, both as a matter
of changing the behavior of individual citizens and as an enforcement priority by
law enforcement officers.
Id.
57. William S. Vickrey, Pricing in Urban and Suburban Transport, in READINGS IN
URBAN TRANSPORTATION 120, 120 (George M. Smerk ed., 1968).
58. See William S. Vickrey, Privatization and Marketization of Transportation, in
PRIVATIZING TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, supra note 21, at 221, 226.
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these inefficiencies.
The basic theory behind congestion pricing should be clear to anyone who has ever
visited a seasonal resort or paid a long distance telephone bill. During the peak
season, where demand for hotel and restaurant services is high, prices at these
establishments are relatively high. During the off-season, where demand drops
precipitously, hotels and restaurants are willing to cut rates sharply so as to attract
bargain-hunting consumers. Similarly, many long distance telephone companies
charge much more for telephone calls made during business hours, when the stress
on long distance networks is relatively high, than for the same calls made at night,
when long distance lines carry excess capacity." These pricing strategies succeed in
shifting some visits and calls from peak periods to off-peak periods. As a result,
system capacity is strained less frequently.
As applied to urban expressways, congestion-pricing schemes would charge
motorists extra fees when they drive on congested roads. The theory is that a driver
on a congested road should be charged for the significant negative externalities she
imposes upon society in the form of slowing down other motorists, poorer air quality,
added noise, and wasted fuel resulting from idling." Because roads are particularly
likely to become congested during the evening and morning commutes, congestionpricing schemes often wind up charging the most from those who commute from
suburbs into urban cores during the traditional morning and evening hours. These
added fees will make it worthwhile for some of these motorists to alter their behavior
so as to avoid paying the congestion fees.62 For example, motorists may switch to
mass transit,' carpooling, 6 or try to travel during nonpeak hours. In the long run,

59. Other advocates of congestion pricing have pointed to ways in which it might correct
for other inefficiencies. For example, John Kain argues that congestion pricing would create
a market test that could help the government determine which roads (and potential roads) will
produce the greatest economic benefits:
Since the prices charged vehicle users for the use of streets and highways in the
U.S. currently bear little or no relationship to these long run costs [of providing
additional capacity], however, it is likely that the capacities of these facilities are
far from optimal. My hunch is that the full scale implementation of congestion
pricing would demonstrate that existing highway networks are generally
overbuilt, but that some segments, particularly relatively cheap roads in rapidly
growing areas, are underbuilt.... In these cases congestion tolls would provide
clear evidence that more capacity should be provided.
KAIN, supra note 14, at 6.
60. See Komanoff, supra note 22, at 132.
61. See Wahrman, supra note 24, at 182, 196.
62. See FEDERAL HIGHwAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'TOF TRANSP., CONGESTION PRICINGNoTES
8 (1998).
63. John Kain argues that congestion pricing would make many motorists see transit or
carpooling as more attractive alternatives to SOV driving:

[T]wo changes in supply characteristcs will make carpooling and transit more
attractive. First, the relative money cost of both carpools and transit will decline
as the money cost of SOV trips increases. Second, the service quality, trips times
and reliability, of both transit and carpools will improve relative to the pre-pricing
SOV alternative, although, of course, not relative to post-congestion-pricing

SOVs. The most obvious way in which congestion pricing would improve the
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they may attempt to live closer to their places of work, so as to avoid freeway charges
altogether. In any event, there is little doubt that congestion-pricing schemes would
reduce freeway congestion.6" The only questions concern whether congestion pricing
is an appropriate, cost-effective, and politically palatable way of doing so.
Obviously, there will be a wealth effect to congestion pricing. If all vehicles of
the same type are charged the same tolls during the same periods,67 these tolls will
constitute a more significant impediment to travel for those who have less income to
spare.61 The question, as posed by Peter Jones, is whether those peak-hour trips that

service quality of both carpools and buses is by increasing vehicle speeds and
reliability (reducing the variance of travel times).... In the case of carpools, for
example, the implementation of congestion pricing would tend to increase the
supply of potential carpool matches for O&D pairs that experience large increases
in money costs and large decreases in carpool travel times.
The supply effects of congestion pricing are likely to be even larger for bus
transit. To the extent that congestion pricing increases the number of transit users,
this increased demand, depending on how the transit operator responds, may lead
to increased frequencies (reduced headways) on existing routes. Mode choice
studies have shown that tripmakers have a much greater disutility for time spent
walking to/from and waiting for transit vehicles.... [relative to] in-vehicle transit
times ....
KAIN, supra note 14, at 34-35.
64. Empirical evidence from congestion-pricing experiments in Singapore and Stuttgart,
Germany, shows that congestion pricing there prompted noticeable increases in carpooling. See
Kenneth A. Small & Jose A. Gomez-Ibafiez, Road PricingforCongestion Management: The
Transitionfrom Theory to Policy, in ROAD PRICING, supra note 27, at 213, 216, 238. Even if

carpools are not exempted from having to pay the congestion prices, there will still be an
incentive to carpool as long as the charge is assessed per-vehicle. Multiple passengers can
divide up the charge amongst themselves.
65. See, e.g., Wahrman, supra note 24, at 198 ("[T]he available data suggests that
congestion pricing with moderate toll increases during peak usage would have substantial
impacts on reducing congestion."); see also Komanoff, supra note 22, at 132 ("[C]ongestion
pricing of roads would be expected to reduce peak usage of roadways via modal shifts to other
forms of travel (e.g., train, bus, bicycle, ridesharing) or shifts in time of travel.").
66. In this Article, I am not interested in taking a position one way or another on the justice
of congestion pricing as applied to roads. I therefore focus on whether the FasTrak program is
perceived as just, not whether it actually is just-however justice might be measured.
67. Administrative concerns currently caution against any effort to differentiate among road
users on the basis of income. But see Wahrman, supra note 24, at 206 ("Assuming a
distributional impact is found among lower-income motorists, the electronic toll system with
individual user accounts does permit for income-based rebates. Accordingly, motorists who
earn below a certain income level could be eligible for rebates based on their annual usage.").
68. See, e.g., LEE W. MUNNICH, JR., ET AL, INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES IN
CONGESTION PRICING: NEW MODELS FOR FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL COOPERATION IN
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT 6 (1995), available in (visited May 9, 2000)
<http://wwv.hhh.umn.edu/centerssip/conpric/cpits.htm>; SMALLET AL., supranote 21, at 87;
FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., REPORT ON THE CONGESTION PRICING
PILOT PROGRAM, A REPORT TO THE SENATE COMM. ON ENV. &PUB.WORKS & HOUSE COMM.
ON TRANSPORTATION &INFRASTRUCTURE 14(1996) ("Key concers... included the view that
low-income persons would be adversely affected by congestion pricing because they have
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will be prevented are those that contribute the least to societal welfare:
The aim of congestion pricing is explicitly to take some traffic off the road
network. The question is whether those least able to pay the charges represent the
types oftraffic that in social terms are regarded as the least essential. In the minds
of many, ability to pay and the importance of the trip are not synonymous.'
In addressing these equity concerns, proponents of congestion pricing make several
responses. First, the revenues generated by congestion-pricing tolls can be, and often
are, used to pay for services that disproportionately benefit low-income commuters."0
At least when analyzed according to the simplistic method of cash-flow, this looks
like a progressive tax: High income motorists pay fees in support of low-income mass
transit programs." Unlike other progressive redistribution schemes, this one will
remain popular with high-income individuals, since they are getting something of
great value to them in return.' Indeed, if current estimates are correct, a national shift
to congestion pricing would generate societal benefits of$5 to $11 billion annually;'
this surplus could be redistributed in a way that improved the welfare of all groups.
Second, proponents point out that poorer citizens are disproportionately burdened by
the negative consequences of congestion, such as air pollution and freeway noise.74
Thus, if congestion pricing works to improve those problems, the poor will benefit
in significant ways. Finally, many have advocated an impure but more politically

fewer opportunities to change time-of-travel or mode of travel due to inflexibility of work
schedules, lack of service by alternative modes, or the need to use an automobile to meet
several trip purposes in a single trip (e.g., work, child care, shopping)."); Komanoff, supranote
22, at 154; Wahrman, supranote 24, at 205 ("Ifone assumes that lower-income users are more
sensitive to price increases than higher-income users, the concern would be that lower-income
users would bear the brunt of higher peak prices and 'only Lexus owners' would be cruising
through a peak-priced roadway."); Dave Addis, Commentary, Rush-HourRoulette: This Lane
for the Affluent, That Lanefor the WorkingStiffs, VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR (Norfolk,

Va.), Aug. 16, 1998, at J1, availablein 1998 WL 15060622; Alice Reid, A HOTA1ternative
to the Slow Lane?, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1998, at BI ("[C]ritics said HOT lanes would be
'Lexus Lanes,' used only by those who could afford them. Statistics collected on road
use... show that commuters making more than $60,000 a year are twice as likely to use HOT
lanes as those who make less than $40,000 a year."); Ed Vulliamy, Private View: First-Class
Lane for Fat Cats Makes an Ass of LA Law, GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 6, 1997, at 20,
available in 1997 WL 14745391.

69. Jones, supra note 27, at 269.
70. See KAIN, supra note 14, at 7; SMALL ETAL., supranote 21, at 96-97.

71. Of course, the high-income toll payers are perhaps better thought of as beneficiaries of
the program, since they are presumably receiving a benefit in the form of time savings that
exceeds the toll amounts they must pay.
72. Cf MUNNICH ETAL., supra note 68, at 16 ("The driver is much more likely to be
supportive if the toll is seen as buying a quicker trip, better transit or other alternatives, a better
environment[,] better neighborhoods.").
73. See id. at 2; see also FEDERAL HIGHwAY ADMIN., supra note 68, at 25 ("If adopted in
congested metropolitan areas nationwide, congestion pricing could result in net economic
savings in terms of time savings and reduced demand for new capacity totaling $5 billion to
$11 billion annually.").
74. See FREUND & MARTIN, supra note 15, at 49; Komanoff, supra note 22, at 154.
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palatable form of congestion pricing that minimizes these equity concerns--charging
motorists to drive in restricted access, uncongested express lanes, while allowing free
access to more heavily congested, general purpose lanes. 5 Low-income drivers will
never face excess cost constraints in getting from point A to point B, but they will
have to face time constraints not faced by those willing to pay the toll. At the same
time, because toll-paying commuters will be siphoned away from the general purpose
lanes, these lanes will become less congested in the short run, thereby providing lowincome drivers with time savings. 6
In addition, whenever the government begins to charge user fees for a good that
was previously available to all free of charge, there will often be opposition.
Congestion pricing "is seen as another form of taxation," and takes away "what was
previously considered free as a matter of right."' Even though congestion-pricing
schemes can be designed to be revenue-neutral, such that fee from tolls replaces tax
revenue, drivers will still feel that they are being deprived of something they formerly
owned. Loss-aversion theory tells us that these types of changes are likely to spark
strong opposition. Over the years, commuters will increasingly see themselves as
entitled to use the roadways that their tax dollars helped build and maintain. 9
Notably, however, congestion pricing for newly constructed toll roads garners
significantly higher public support."0

75. See WALTERS, supra note 40, at 218 ("The combination of tollway and free road
therefore provides a superior 'mix' of road services than simply one type of road service on
one highway. Each motorist can choose the service appropriate to his circumstances.").
76. The short-run/long-run distinction is particularly appropriate whenever free roadway
lanes are discussed because of the "law of highway congestion," which holds that latent
demand for congested roads always exists among motorists who would drive but for the
inhibiting effects of congestion. SMALL, supranote 20, at 113. Thus, in the long run, building
more roads will often simply bring more cars to use the roads, resulting in no net decrease in
congestion. For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see generally ANTHONY
DowNs, STUCK INTRAFFIC: COPING WITH PEAK-HOUR TRAFFIC CONGESTION (1992).
77. Wahrman, supranote 24, at 204; see MUNNICHETAL., supranote 68, at 6 ("In Houston
many participants felt that Houstonians... have already paid for the roads, making new tolls
unpopular."); SMALL ETAL., supranote 21, at 87 ("Travel is widely regarded as a basic right.
People who mistrust governments may regard congestion pricing as a sinister form of tax
increase."); Jones, supra note 27, at 269 ("The urban road network (unlike motorways) is
implicitly viewed as a general purpose public space, which all are free to share. With the
encroachment of the market on other areas that were previously in the public domain.., it
represents one of a diminishing number of situations where people are treated equally.").
78. See generally Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and

Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERsPS. 193 (1991) (reviewing the loss aversion literature).
79. See Carl B. Williams, Lessons from Road PrivatizaionExperience, in PRIVATIZING
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, supra note 21, at 249, 254 ("In the United States, a new toll

highway presents no such problem, but establishing tolls to recover the cost of resurfacing a
previously untolled highway will engender considerable resentment.").
80. See Robert Krol, When FreewaysTake Their Toll: Low PricesandHighDemandEqual
a Shortage, Gridlockin the Case of Roads, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999, at B17 (noting a 17point rise, from 38% to 55%, when Angelinos are polled with respect to charging tolls for
existing roads versus new roads as a means of easing congestion); cf Oren, supranote 26, at

307-08 (noting that the political difficulties involved in converting general purpose lanes into
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Another potential problem that has been raised concerning congestion pricing is the
administrative and traffic burdens that might result, from fee collection. It is
commonly understood that toll collection booths invariably result in long queues of
motorists waiting to pay the toll. New technologies, which utilize car-based
transponders and sensors that can make electronic deductions from prepaid accounts,
82
8
allow for fully automated toll collection, ' thereby eliminating annoying queues.
Drivers need not even slow down: When they drive underneath an automatic sensor,
the appropriate amount is deducted from their account. Indeed, within a few years,
toll enforcement may join fee collection as a fully automated process. 3 When a
vehicle lacking a transponder drives through an express lane, it would be
photographed by surveillance cameras. Even if HOVs are exempted from the toll,
automated enforcement can still work. If an inspection revealed that the vehicle
contained fewer occupants than those required to qualify it as an HOV, the license
number will be recorded, and the driver will be sent a fine notice in the mail." The
ease of using these systems promises to boost popular support for congestion pricing
in the future.8"
The flip side of electronic toll collection concerns some civil libertarians. They
have expressed a fear that government access to information about where people are
traveling amounts to an invasion of privacy. 6 Of course, this type of privacy invasion
may well prove harmless or even desirable. For instance, transponder information
might prove extremely useful to law enforcement officials who could check a
criminal suspect's transponder information to see if her travel patterns match her
purported alibi. Even more beneficially, this information would be ofgreat assistance
to police officers in pinpointing the likely locations of stolen vehicles, provided that
the transponder could be fixed in a difficult-to-find-and-access portion of the car."
The transponders could thus function as a poor man's LoJack, an anti-theft device

carpool lanes are lessened when new carpool lanes are built).
81. See SAMUEL, supranote 26, at 29 (noting that fully automated toll collection has been
implemented successfully in Toronto); SMALL, supra note 20, at 11 ("Hong Kong conducted
an elaborate and highly successful field test of electronic technology for collecting congestion
fees.").

82. See J.R. MEYER ET AL., THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION

PROBLEM 325 (1966).

83. See infra note 186.
84. See generallyWILBUR SMITH ASSOCS., PROJECTCONCEPT PLAN-B: FULL OPERATIONS
IMPLEMENTATION 3-9 (1997), availablein (visited May 16,2000) <http://www.sandag.cog.ca.
us/dataservices/fastrak/pdfs/task-la.pdf> (describing the potential effectiveness of such a
system in San Diego).
85. See SMALL ET AL., supra note 21, at 89; see also Small & Gomez-Ibafiez, supra note
64, at 216 (noting that collection costs from the Singapore congestion-pricing experiment
amounted to 11% of the revenue collected).
86. See, e.g., SMALL ETAL., supranote 21, at 87-88; Wahrman, supranote 24, at 204. The
metaphor used by privacy advocates is the cheating husband whose adultery is discovered by
a spouse who sees his monthly toll road bill.
87. In theory, the system could even be set up so that whenever a car that had been reported
stolen passed underneath a highway sensor, local law-enforcement officials would be alerted
immediately.
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available free of charge. 8 But even if a large number of citizens were worried about
the prospects that their travel routes, currently kept private, might become public,
there are a number of technological alternatives for laying these concerns to rest. As
William Vickery suggests, the privacy concern is something of a red herring:
A simple system could allow, individuals to opt for a class of identifying codes
that would erase information regarding place and possibly time from the record
as soon as the appropriate charge has been computed. It would then be virtually
impossible for even a skillful programmer to recover the sensitive information.89
Thus, if the law enforcement benefits trump privacy concerns, then congestion
pricing utilizing electronic transponders claims another benefit relative to the status
quo. Alternatively, if public concern with privacy issues trumps law enforcement
benefits, technology can easily solve the privacy problems that technology helped
create.
Having introduced the literature on HOV lanes and congestion pricing, I will now
explore in detail an innovative effort by one jurisdiction, San Diego, to put both

principles into practice.
II. CONGESTION PRICING INPRACTICE

Although congestion pricing for urban expressways has had many eloquent
supporters in the economic and city-planning academies for decades-William
Vickery first testified before Congress in support of the policy in 1958--congestion
pricing was resisted for many years inthe United States. All the same, policy planners
in this country were able to monitor the results of Singapore's innovative experiment
with congestion pricing on its urban roads, a program that was launched in 1975.90
That program was generally viewed as a successful and efficient way to control
traffic congestion, 9' which helped boost the prospects for an American pilot program.
In 1991, Congress enacted the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
("ISTEA"). 92 Among its many provisions, the Act encouraged metropolitan planning
authorities to implement congestion pricing as part of their long-term traffic
management plans.93 The Act made tens of millions of dollars available for a number
of pilot programs to test the viability of congestion pricing.94 The largest share of

88. For a thorough discussion of LoJack and its impressive theft-reducing effects for car
owners, see Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from
Unobservable Victim Precaution:An EmpiricalAnalysisofLojack, 113 Q.J. ECON. 43 (1998).

LoJack is a registered trademark of the LoJack Corporation.
89. Vickrey, supra note 58, at 233.
90. See SMALL ET AL., supranote 21, at 87-88.
91. See Timothy D. Hall, Congestion Pricingand Road Investment, in ROAD PRICING,

supra note 27, at 39, 40-41.
92.23 U.S.C. §§ 100-501 (1994).
§ 134(g)(2)(B), amendedby Pub. L. No. 105-178 § 1203(g)(3) (codified
93. See, e.g., id.
as amended at 23 U.S.C.A. § 134(g)(2)(B) (West 1998)) (removing the explicit reference to
congestion pricing)).
94. See Wahrman, supranote 24, at 188 (noting that $31 million had been spent on such
programs as of 1998); see also FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMIN., supranote 62, at8 ("[C]ongestion

1250

INDIANA LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 75:1231

these funds,just under $8 million, went to the San Diego Association of Governments
("SANDAG")." This federal grant was the dominant funding source relied upon by
SANDAG in launching its congestion-pricing program, which it named FasTrak.96
A. Program Description
San Diego, California is one of the nation's most congested metropolitan areas.97
The congestion on the city's freeways is largely a result of rapid growth in traffic
during the 1980s.98 Interstate 15 (1-15) is the main commuter artery connecting the
city's northern inland suburbs with the southern downtown core. Like many cities
trying to deal with congested freeways and the significant projected population
growth, San Diego began experimenting with HOV lanes, opening up the first ones
along the 1-15 corridor in 1988. 9 These lanes were added as part of a freeway
expansion. Although a vehicle needed only two occupants in order to constitute a
carpool," ° the HOV lanes tended to be underutilized.' As HOV lane traffic zoomed
through uncongested lanes, speeds in the general purpose lanes became slower each
year. In the years that followed, carpooling increased significantly. 2 Still, even after
carpool traffic began to increase, the HOV lanes remained underutilized.' 3
As a result of this underutilization of the HOV lanes and the worsening congestion

pricing has received serious consideration by transportation policy makers in at least 17 states
over the past 6 years [since the ISTEA's enactment].").
95. See JANUSz SUPERNAKETAL., 1-15 CONGESTION PRICING PROJECT MONITORINGAND
EVALUATION SERVICES, PHASE I OVERALL REPORT 6 (1999), availablein (visited May 16,
2000) <http://www.sandag.cog.ca.us/dataservices/fastrak/pdfs/i-15.pdf>.
96. See ERIC N. SCHREFFLER ET AL., PHASE I IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES, POLICIES,
AGREEMENTS, AND BARRIERS 2 (1998), available in (visited May 16, 2000)
<http://www.sandag.cog.ca.us/data.services/fastrak/pdfs/task-3.3.1 .pdf>.
97. See MUNNICH ET AL., supra note 68, at 18 tbl.7.

98. Among major metropolitan areas in the United States experiencing significant traffic
congestion, San Diego easily posted the highest increases in congestion during the 1982-1988
period. In that brief time span, congestion in San Diego increased by 45%. The next highest
increase experienced by a metropolitan area during the same period was in the San Francisco
Bay region, which experienced a 32% increase. See KAIN, supra note 14, at 24 tbl.4.
99. See SUPERNAK ET AL., supra note 95, at 5.

100. See Wahrman, supra note 24, at 201.
101. See id.
According to 1990 Census data, 12.8% of San Diego's drivers carpooled to
work, while 70.7% drove to work alone. See U.S. Census Bureau, Travel to Work
Characteristicsfor the 50 LargestCities by Populationin the United States (visited May 11,

2000) <http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/j oumey/city.txt>.
102. See Wahrman, supra note 24, at 10. A recent report prepared for SANDAG presents
the data:
Over the last 10 years, the total number ofpersons travelling in the I-15 corridor
during the a.m. peak period increased by 31 percent from 32,860 in 1988 to
42,977 in 1997. This increase in persons carried through the 1-15 corridor is due
to the significant increase in the HOV population in the corridor as well as
improved utilization of the 1-15 Express Lanes.
SUPERNAK ET AL., supranote 95, at 13.
103. See Small & Gomez-Ibafiez, supra note 64, at 230-31.
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in the general purpose lanes, several of San Diego's government officials took an
interest in congestion pricing. In particular, Jan Goldsmith, who was a state
assemblyman from San Diego at the time, and had previously been a popular mayor
of a San Diego suburb, energetically championed congestion pricing on 1-152' The
plan he proposed was simple but revolutionary: HOVs could continue to use the 1-15
Express Lanes for free, but SOVs would be given the option of buying their way into
the Express Lanes as well. Never before had any American city created a hybrid
carpool/toll lane of this kind. While San Diego's citizens initially responded with
great skepticism to the proposal,' its boldness, the tenacity of its chief patron, and
the grim outlook for congestion along the corridor succeeded in convincing the city's
political institutions that the novel idea was worth trying.
In December of 1996 the FasTrak program was formally launched. For fifty dollars
per month, solo drivers could purchase decals that would allow them to ride in the
Express (HOV) Lanes. The initial allotment of 500 passes was quickly exhausted." °
Gradually, the number of passes available to the public increased, as did the price at
which they were being sold. At this stage, the program was a far-from-perfect
congestion- pricing scheme. After all, the purchaser of a monthly permit was allowed
unlimited.0 7 use of the "HOT" lanes.'
After six months of charging a fixed monthly fee, SANDAG moved to a per-use
charge system."°9 When a driver approaches an entrance to the Express Lanes, he sees
an illuminated sign specifying a certain toll for using the Express Lanes. The more
traffic is in the Express Lanes, the higher the toll will be. Not surprisingly, the
Express Lanes tend to be most crowded when the general lanes are most crowded, so
there is a strong correlation between the toll charged and the congestion in the main
lanes on 1-15. When the solo driver uses the Express Lanes he must pass through a
certain lane, a transponder mounted inside the car signals a ground-based sensor, and
a deduction in the amount of the posted toll is automatically made from the FasTrak
user's pre-paid account. (Carpools have their own specially-marked lane, and no
deduction is made from a FasTrak user who drives through this lane). "' In 1998, the
average tolls ranged from $1.95 to $2.26 per trip."' At present, more than 13,000

104. See

SCHREFFLER ET AL.,

supra note 96, at 4, 9.

105. See GODBE RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, Focus GROUPS OF 1-15 COMMUTERS 5 (1997),

availablein (visited May 16,2000) <http://vww.sandag.cog.ca.usdataservicesfastrak/pdfsl
godbe.pdf>.
106. See JACQUELINE GOLOB ASSOCS., PHASE I ACCEPTANCE OF THE PROJECT AND THE
PRICING CONCEPT 4 (1998), availablein (visited May 16,2000) <http://wwv.sandag.cog.ca.
us/dataservices/fastrakpdfs/acceptance.pdf>.
107. Actually, the lanes are only open during the commute hours on weekdays, so
"unlimited" use is perhaps something of a misnomer. See 1-15 FasTrak Online, Frequently
Asked Questions(visited May 10, 2000) <http://www.sandag.cog.ca.usldataservices/fastrakl
faq.html>.
108. Transportation planners refer to toll lanes where HOVs are exempted from the toll as
HOT lanes, which presumably stands for "High Occupancy Toll" lanes.
109. See WILBUR SMITH Assocs., supra note 84, at 2-3.
110. Telephone Interview with Sharon Gordon, SANDAG Asst. Project Manager, FasTrak
Program (Feb. II, 1999).
11 1.See I-15ExPREss NEWS (SANDAG), Summer 1998, at3, availablein (visited May 17,
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drivers have obtained transponders." 2 The program has had high visibility since its
inception, as eighty-seven percent of all 1-15 users were aware ofFasTrak's existence
in 1997."'
B. FasTrak'sEffect on Traffic Patterns
The immediate effect of the FasTrak program was to shift traffic from the 1-15
main lanes to the Express Lanes. During the first year ofthe program's operation, the
volume of traffic in the Express Lanes increased by twenty percent in the morning
peak periods, and by twelve percent in the afternoon peak periods." 4 At the same
time, traffic volumes in the main lanes decreased by approximately two to three
percent." 5 Not surprisingly, this decrease in traffic in the main lanes was
accompanied by an increase in average vehicular speeds." 6 Those solo drivers who
could now afford to buy their way into the Express Lanes reported average time
savings of ten to forty minutes over a ten-mile stretch of road," 7 although
SANDAG's data suggests that drivers have tended to overestimate their daily time
savings.'' 8
The initial assessments of FasTrak suggest that the program has prompted much
more efficient uses of the San Diego highways. Significant capacity was added to the
Express Lanes without noticeably slowing average speeds there. The diversion of
traffic to the Express Lanes did speed up traffic in the main lanes. As a result, the
economic costs of 1-15 congestion to the San Diego region dropped by eighteen
percent between fall 1996 (pre-FasTrak) and fall 1997.' Indeed, that figure may
underestimate, in economic terms, the true value of FasTrak to the region. After all,
it does not account for the fact that much ofthe SOV traffic realizing the greatest time

2000) <http://www.sandag.cog.ca.us/dataservices/fastrakpdfssum98.pdf > . The tolls range
between $0.50 and $8.00 per use, but will only exceed $4.00 in the event of "severe traffic
congestion." 1-15 FasTrak Online, Toll Schedule and Information (visited May 10, 2000)
<http://www.sandag.cog.ca.usdata_.servicesfastraklschedule.html>.
112. See 1-15 FasTrak Online, What'sNew (visited May 10, 2000) <http://www.sandag.cog.
ca.us/dataservices/fastrak/press.html>.
113. See JACQUELINE GOLOB Assocs., supra note 106, at 7.
114. See SUPERNAK ET AL., supra note 95, at 12.
115. See id.
116. See id.
at 14-15.
117. See GODBE RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 9; see also Federal Highway
Admin., U.S. Dep'tofTransp., RegionalCongestionPricingWorkshop (visited May 10, 2000)
<http://www.hhh.umn.edu/centerslslp/conpric/tampa.htm> (reporting an average time savings
of 10 to 20 minutes).
118. See

JACQUELINE GOLOB ET AL., PHASE I ATrITUDINAL PANEL STUDY 94 (1998),

availablein (visited May 17,2000) <http://www.sandag.cog.ca.us/dataservices/fastraklpdfs
task-3.2.3.pdf>.
119. See SUPERNAK ET AL., supranote 95, at 15.
Annual estimated delay costs for the 1-15 corridor was $4.2 million for fall 1997,

which is 18 percent less than delay costs for fall 1996 ($5.20 million). The
reduction in 1-15 costs of delay was caused by a slight reduction in traffic
volumes and by an increase in average speed traveled in the 1-15 main lanes.
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savings from the program (ExpressPass users) are those whose time is most valuable.
Nor does it account for the slight increase in business patronage that apparently
resulted from the program.'
But the most interesting changes that resulted from FasTrak's implementation had
less to do with the amount of traffic using the 1-15 corridor, and more to do with the
type of traffic using the corridor. One of the harshest criticisms leveled against the
program from its inception was that by selling spots in an HOV lane to SOV drivers,
the FasTrak program would discourage carpooling.' Several related arguments were
made by those who anticipated such an effect. Some felt that allowing SOV drivers
into the lanes would cause many current carpoolers to opt for FasTrak passes instead
ofcarpooling," thereby increasing the number of cars on the road. Others suggested
that by selling spots in the HOV lanes, the program would increase congestion in
those lanes, thereby prompting some carpoolers-who currently carpool so as to
secure the time and safety benefits of driving in extremely uncongested lanes-to
cease viewing carpooling as worth the effort." Finally, some felt that selling access
to the HOV lanes undermined the purpose of the HOV lane program, which was to
reward those whose decisions to carpool produced positive externalities relating to
air quality and decreased traffic.2 By establishing a kind of moral equivalency
among those who had paid to use the Express Lanes and those whose decisions to
carpool were making other motorists better off, some environmentalists felt that the
law's expressive statement of approval for carpooling would be eroded.'2 For these
reasons, carpoolers were the most vocal critics of allowing solo drivers to use the
HOV lanes in exchange for a fee. 6

120. See GOLOB ET AL., supranote 118, at 54.
121.See, e.g., Small & Gomez-Ibafiez, supranote 64, at231 ("Environmentalists sometimes
oppose HOT lanes on the grounds that they might dilute the incentive to carpool.").
122. See GOLOB ETAL., supra note 118, at 46.
123. See GODBE RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, supranote 37, at 13. But cf JACQUELINE GOLOB
AsSOCS., supranote 106, at 10.
Most importantly, there is no evidence of perceived negative impacts of the
program on carpoolers, which is contrary to the fears expressed by 1-15 Express
Lanes users in the pre-project period. Free-flow conditions were maintained in the
Express Lanes during Phase I,which likely resulted in the less negative views by
carpoolers.
Id,
124. See, e.g., JANUSZ SUPERNAK ET AL., PHASE I MEDIA RELATIONS AND COVERAGE 5
(1998), available in (visited May 23, 2000) <http://vww.sandag.cog.ca.us/dataservices/fast

rakfpdfs/media.pdf> ("[S]ome carpool users on 1-15 ...felt disappointed that officials have
abandoned the original ideato allow only carpoolers on the Express Lanes. One such carpooler
asked: 'What happened to the goal of reduced pollution and conserving energy?'"); WILBUR
SMrrH ASSOCS., supra note 50, at 8 ("Carpoolers may feel entitled to the exclusive use of the
Express Lanes and resent their use by others who have not adjusted their lifestyles or made the
decision and switched to rideshare."); Richard Simon, As Toll Roads Gain Toehold in
Southland Critics Fear "Highway Robbery", L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1995, at B2. ("'If you

allow people to buy into the [high-occupancy-vehicle] lane, you defeat the purpose of having
HOV lanes,"' which is to reduce smog ....") (quoting State Sen. Tom Hayden).

125. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see infratext accompanying notes 276-82.
126. See GOLOB ET AL., supra note 118, at 60; CAMILLA KAZIMI Er AL., PHASE I
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On the other hand, FasTrak advocates pitched the program as a means of increasing
carpooling. 27 They suggested that using the FasTrak lanes would whet the appetites
of motorists for the quicker commutes that Express Lanes travel could provide.
Among those who had experienced the swifter commutes, some would continue to
pay for the privilege, but others would find it more worth their while to carpool and
obtain the advantages ofHOT commuting for "free."' 2 Additionally, they argued that
providing carpoolers with a tangible monetary benefit from carpooling actually
attached a greater stamp of approval than the existence of an HOV lane alone. 29 Of
course, prior to the initiation ofFasTrak, carpoolers could use the HOV lanes for free,
and the program did not alter that. But relative to paying solo drivers, carpoolers
might still have felt that they were getting a new financial benefit from carpooling,
which they did not receive when access to the lanes was not commodified. Thus, to
oversimplify matters somewhat, carpoolers felt richer precisely because solo drivers
became slightly poorer. 3

MARKETING AND PROMOTIONAL EFFORTS 3 (1998), available in (visited May 17, 2000)
<www.sandag.cog.ca.usdataservices/fastrak/pdfs/marketing.pdf> (noting that, originally,
70% ofcarpoolers and transit users were either very opposed or somewhat opposed to the buyin program). But see WILBUR SMITH Assocs., supranote 50, at 8 ("In the telephone survey,
carpool drivers were not opposed to the buy-in program."). Data released as this Article went
to press showed that individual commuters began using the Express Lanes for an increasing
proportion of their commutes during the life of the program. This data supports the hypothesis
that motorists would develop an increasingly powerful taste for quick commutes. See JANUSZ
SUPERNAK ET AL., PHASE Two YEAR TwO OVERALL REPORT 33 (2000), availablein (visited
May 26, 2000) <http:llwww.sandag.cog.ca.us/dataservices/fastraklpdfs/yr2-overall.pdf>.
127. Telephone Interview with Sharon Gordon, supranote 110.
128. Simon, supranote 124, at B2 ("'We think that once people try it and enjoy the [average
20-minute time] savings, that in the American way, they'll try to figure out a way to avoid the
cost. One way to do that is to get another person in their car."') (alteration in original) (quoting
John Duve, SANDAG Project Mgr. for Advanced Transportation Systems).
129. Cf SUPERNAK ET AL., supra note 95, at 29 ("A possible reason for the increase in
HOVs could be that carpoolers obtained a more tangible sense of substantial cost savings by
carpooling; they could travel for free while solo drivers paid to use the Express Lanes.").
130. Ian Ayres has pointed out to me that this conclusion runs directly opposite to what
economic theory would suggest. A classical economist would argue that FasTrak should make
solo drivers feel richer because it gives them a new option of riding in the carpool lanes, and
this addition to their opportunity set is valuable in economic terms. The carpoolers should feel
simultaneously poorer, because they now have to share the Express Lanes, and richer, because
they now have the option ofjettisoning the extra passengers in their vehicles without having
to give up the perk of a quicker commute. In order to gauge whether carpoolers would feel a
net economic gain or loss from the program, an economist would compare the magnitude of
the benefit and detriment. Ignoring for a moment the program's effect on cheating by
nonpaying solo commuters, if there is significant excess capacity in the lanes even after solo
motorists are allowed in, one would expect that carpoolers would feel richer. If not, then they
would probably feel poorer.
The relative-deprivation story that I am telling in the text diverges from this classical
economic analysis. My research leads me to believe that the primary reason carpoolers feel
richer has to do with their status relative to solo commuters. Thus looking only at absolute
wealth, as opposed to an individual's wealth relative to her peers, obscures the way that people
really conceive of their economic circumstances. "Keeping up with the Joneses" is more than
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Somewhat surprisingly, experience has supported the claim that FasTrak increases
carpooling. An analysis ofcarpool volumes revealed statistically significant increases
in carpooling almost across the board:
Carpool volumes on the 1-15 Express Lanes increased substantially since the
program started in December 1996. Based on WSA data, total carpools increased
from 8,572 per day in January 1997 to 9,971 per day in December 1997. The
increased carpools consisted of a 10 percent increase forthe a.m. peak period that
was not statistically significant and a 21 percent statistically significant increase
for the p.m. peak period.... Another data source.., also shows an increase in
carpools, 25 percentforthe a.m. peakperiod (3,013 to 3,759) and a 15 percent for
the p.m. peak period (4,797 to 5,537 from October 1996 to October 1997. i3'
The implications of this data were not lost on those who have studied the program,
who hailed it as "one of the most important observations during Phase I.1' 32 Data
collected for SANDAG also revealed that very few former carpoolers were becoming
SOV Express Lanes users. Ninety-five percent of ExpressPass users had previously
commuted alone. 33 Moreover, a higher percentage of carpoolers perceived3 4their
commutes as having gotten quicker after the FasTrak program was initiated.
Data collected by SANDAG suggests that relatively few FasTrak users developed
a "taste" for riding in the Express Lanes that prompted them to switch from solo
driving to carpooling. Only four percent of those motorists who dropped out of the
13
FasTrak program during its initial stages did so because of a switch to carpooling. 1

just an American motto: It's a socio-psychological axiom. See generallyRichard H. McAdams,
Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992) (marshalling an impressive quantum of social
science evidence to argue that people's welfare often depends on their perceived wealth/status
relative to neighbors and peers).
131. SUPERNAKETAL., supra note 95, at 13; see also Federal Highway Admin., supra note
117 (reporting a 21% increase in the number of carpools using the lanes).
132. SUPERNAK ET AL., supra note 95, at 29; see also id. at 32 ("Congestion pricing does
not appear to be a policy that adversely impacts HOV use in the corridor. On the contrary, it
may have the potential to increase travelers' interest in carpooling, if it remains anon-fee travel
option."). Of course, it is possible that, contrary to SANDAG's conclusions, the increase in
HOV traffic since the program's initiation may have had more to do with external factors such
as changing commercial development and work patterns. Telephone Interview with Jay Gainer,
Manager, FasTrak Customer Service Center (Apr. 12, 1999).
133. See GOLOB ET AL., supra note 118, at 45-46.

134. See id.at 82 ("Only five percent of I-15 carpoolers responded that the program resulted
in a slightly longer or significantly longer travel time. Surprisingly, a slightly larger percentage
of I-15 carpoolers (8%) think that the ExpressPass program resulted in their travel time being
shorter or significantly shorter.") This perception is probably counterfactual, since the number
of vehicles using the lanes did increase during the program's first year. See SUPERNAK ETAL.,
supra note 95, at 17. Nevertheless, a combination of two factors might explain it. Firstcarpoolers may have perceived that the drop in SOV violators using the lanes more than offset
the increase in traffic by transponder-using SOV motorists. Second, carpoolers may have
noticed that the scrutiny to which the pilot program was subjected resulted in increased
responsiveness to motorists' concerns about maintaining the free flow of traffic in the lanes.
135. See GOLOB Er AL., supra note 118, at 45 tbl.28. At the same time, it would be
premature to dismiss the "acquired taste" theory out of hand. Anecdotal evidence reveals that
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This percentage is almost equal to the percentage of former carpoolers whojoined the
FasTrak program, suggesting a basic equilibrium between these two groups,136 at least
in the short term.' Thus, the new carpools consisted mostly of drivers who had
neither used an ExpressPass nor participated in a carpool during the previous year.
Generalizing from this data, it appears that the most likely explanation for the
significant increase in carpooling rates that coincided with the implementation of the
FasTrak program is as follows: By supplementing the time savings that HOV users
obtain by riding in HOV lanes with a quantifiable monetary saving that they get
relative to solo drivers, carpooling became a more attractive option. The interesting
question of whether this trend is actually more likely than the existence of HOV lanes
alone to support a "norm of carpooling" will be addressed in the next Part of the
Article.
C. FasTrak'sEffect on Compliance
Another important behavioral change occurred during FasTrak's first year. The
percentage of motorists in the Express Lanes who were unauthorized to be there
dropped precipitously. In October of 1996, two months before the start ofthe FasTrak
program, approximately fifteen percent of the vehicles using the carpool-only HOV
lanes were SOV drivers violating the law.' 38 During the first month of the program,
the violation rate fell to between three percent and five percent. 3 9 The average
violation rate was approximately three percent during the program's first year and
three-and-a-half percent during its second year. 4 Eric N. Schreffier, who was
commissioned by SANDAG to study enforcement of the 1-15 program, concluded

a large number of carpoolers will solo commute and use their ExpressPasses one day a week
because they simply cannot imagine driving in stop-and-go traffic after having become
accustomed to the rapid pace of traffic in the Express Lanes. Telephone Interview with Jay
Gainer, supranote 132. This suggests that FasTrak customers may well become accustomed
to quick commutes, such that if the 1-15 tolls were to become too high or their incomes were
to fall, these FasTrak users would consider carpooling.
136. See also GODBE RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, supra note 105, at 12 ("No respondents in
the HOV group revealed an increase or decrease in carpool, vanpool or bus usage as a result
of the Express Pass program.").
137. Undoubtedly, a number of individuals in both groups became occasional carpoolers or
ExpressPass users, but, unfortunately, SANDAG's data was not broken down in any great
detail. As it is currently structured, there is little incentive for motorists to leave the FasTrak
program, since all charges are assessed on a per-use basis.
138. See ERIC N. SCHREFFLER, PHASE I ENFORCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND VIOLATION
ASSESSMENT app. A at 7 (1998), availablein (visited May 17,2000) <http://www.sandag.cog.
ca.us/dataservices/fastrak/pdfs/enforcement.pdf>. Some caution is in order here. Scattered
data collected by SANDAG and Caltrans from single days in 1995 and 1996 reveals much
lower violation rates. See id. at 4. However, the methodological credibility of this data is
questionable. See id. The data quoted in the text was collected by the same independent
transportation consultants, using the same methodology during all periods studied. See id
139. See id. app. A at 7.
140. See JANUSZ SUPERNAK & CHRISTINE KASCHADE, PHASE II YEAR Two ENFORCEMENT
EFFECTVENESS AND VIOLATION ASSESSMENT 7 (1999), availablein (visited May 17, 2000)

<http://www.sandag.cog.ca.us/dataservices/fastrak/pdfs/599_enforce.pdf>.
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that "[t]he significant decrease in violators since the start of the ExpressPass program
may be due to increased CHP presence on the Express Lanes and the conversion of
prior SOV violators to ExpressPass Customers."'' Schreffler's analysis seems
persuasive. It is certainly the case that the law against unlawful use of the lanes was
enforced much more vigorously after the program was launched.'42 SANDAG
contracted with the California Highway Patrol (CHP) to ensure that an officer was
frequently monitoring the lanes during the commuting hours.'43 This heightened
enforcement undoubtedly boosted compliance levels significantly, and may well
account for some of the apparent drop in violations.
Under FasTrak and similar congestion-pricing programs, the governmental or
private authority operating the road will have a strong incentive to monitor cheating
vigorously. A study prepared for SANDAG correctly notes that two groups will be
particularly vocal in their desire for enforcement:
Express Pass users, carpoolers and transit users alike will continue to want
vigorous enforcement on the Express Lanes to ensure that only qualified users are
allowed in the lanes. The Express Pass users will want enforcement because they
are paying for the privilege, and carpoolers do not want any unauthorized solo
drivers using the lanes.'"
The obvious underlying analysis is that if ExpressPass users and carpoolers see that
unauthorized motorists are driving in the Express Lanes and getting away with it, they
will be less likely to pay a fee or carpool in the future. As a result, the operating
agency or firm would lose toll revenue and face increased congestion-unattractive
prospects for transit officials. Indeed, part of the reason for the popularity of the
FasTrak program' 45 probably has to do with the perception that enforcement efforts
have been effective.' 46
FasTrak has also created the potential for significant private enforcement of the
rules against SOV cheating in the Express Lanes. It appears that ExpressPass users
feel more strongly than any other group about the need for enforcement of the law
against cheating. ExpressPass users, not carpoolers, are most likely to complain to
law enforcement officials when they see a number of unauthorized vehicles driving

141. SCHREFFLER, supranote 138, at 4. The size of the fine for using the lanes unlawfully
remained stable at $271 throughout the first year of the program. See id.at 3.
142. See SUPERNAK & KASCHADE, supranote 140, at 5-6.
143. Telephone Interview with Karyn Menpink, California Highway Patrol Officer (Mar.
26, 1999); see also GOLOB ErAL., supranote 118, at 85 ("By way of background, prior to the
start of the ExpressPass program, the California Highway Patrol dedicated vehicles and/or
motocycles to specifically enforce of [sic] the 1-15 Express Lanes approximately one day per
month. Since the start of the program, dedicated enforcement of the Express Lanes has
increased to approximately three days per week.").
144. FRANK WILSON & Assocs., supra note 48, at 7.
145. See JACQUELINE GOLOB Assocs., supranote 106, at 8, 10; SUPERNAK Er AL., supra
note 95, at 21, 26-27.
146. See GOLOB ET AL., supra note 118, at 83 ("At least 61 percent of 1-15 respondents
believe that the current level of enforcement of the Express Lanes is about right, between 20
and 37 percent believe it is insufficient, and less than five percent believe it is excessive.").
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in the Express Lanes.' 47 Thus, enforcement ofthe FasTrak program may be buttressed
by the presence of a second group that has a strong interest in maintaining adherence
to the law. Recall that in traditional HOV lanes, by contrast, carpoolers are the only
group of motorists adhering to the carpool missionary norm, that is, those who are
intensely interested in preventing violations.'48 Although cellularphone wielding San
Diego motorists are potentially excellent sources of violation reports, 49 SANDAG
does not have any program that encourages them to assist the CHP in enforcing the
law. 5 Nevertheless, a small, but ever-increasing number of motorists do use their
cellular phones to report to SANDAG or the CHP that individual vehicles are
unlawfully using the Express Lanes.' At the very least, however, the existence of
two groups who support strict adherence to the law will likely prompt greater political
pressures for resources to be devoted to enforcing the law on the Express Lanes.
Although beefed-up enforcement may well account for some of the apparent drop
in violations, other explanations also help explain the change. After all, violation rates
from San Diego did not rise and fall in tandem with police monitoring of the lanes.
The lowest recorded violation levels occurred in November of 1998, when only 0.7%
of Express Lane users were unauthorized." 2 That month, however, CHP enforcement

147. Telephone Interview with Jay Gainer, supra note 132; Telephone Interview with Karyn
Menpink, supranote 143. Gainer provides two reasons for this propensity to complain. First,
ExpressPass users must pay higher tolls when there are more vehicles using the Express Lanes.
Thus, violators impose a real financial cost on ExpressPass users. Second, ExpressPass users
do not want to feel like "suckers" who pay for the privilege of riding in the Express Lanes
while others abuse the system and ride for free. Gainer also reports that ExpressPass users are
usually delighted to see CHP officers pull violators over for the purpose of ticketing them.
148. See supra text accompanying note 48.
149. ExpressPass users own cellular phones at much higher rates than typical San Diego
residents. See GOLOB ET AL., supra note 118, at 14; see also supra note 50.

150. Telephone Interview with Karyn Menpink, supra note 143. Officer Menpink offers a
rather compelling reason for this reluctance. She suggests that drivers often get into accidents
or dangerous confrontations when they try to rat on fellow motorists. For example, she told of
a motorist calling from his cellular phone to report that he was right behind another motorist
who was driving in excess of 100 miles per hour, prompting a query from the dispatcher as to
why the telephoning motorist was also driving 100 miles per hour so as to keep pace. Among
the nation's 37 largest cities, San Diego has the 16th most instances of accidents resulting from
aggressive driving. See Larry Lange, Here in Seattle, The Road is Less Raged over Even in
That Awful Traffic, We're a Bit More Civil, Data Indicate, SEArrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,

Mar. 9, 1999, at B1, availablein 1999 WL 6584069 (ranking the cities based on data from a
recent study). For an interesting discussion of the related phenomenon of "road rage," see
generally Jason Vest et al., Road Rage: Tailgating, Giving the Finger, Outright
Violence-Americans Grow More Likely To Take out Their Frustrationson Other Drivers,

U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., June 2, 1997, at 23.
15 1. Telephone Interview with Jay Gainer, supranote 132; see also CHRISTINE KASCHADE
ET AL., PHASE II YEAR Two MEDIA RELATIONS AND COVERAGE, MARKETING, AND PUBLIC
RESPONSE 38-46 (1999), availablein (visited May 23, 2000) <http://www.sandag.cog.ca.us/
dataservices/fastrak/pdfs/599_media.pdf> (logging such complaints received by FasTrak
customer service representatives).
152. See SUPERNAK & KASCHADE, supra note 140, at 6, 13 (author's calculations are based
on the data provided therein).
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was relatively low. By contrast, in April of 1998, CHP's presence was much greater,
but 4.7% of cars in the lanes were using them unlawfully.'
Schreffier's second explanation" 4 for the significant drop in violations-that
former HOV violators are being converted into ExpressPass users-is particularly

noteworthy. A number of former violators who previously would run a small risk of
paying a large fine have now decided that paying a regular fee for lawful use of the
Express Lanes is preferable. 5 In all likelihood, these individuals are making rational
calculations abouthowto maximizetheir ownwelfare.' 56 Even ifthe average monthly
payments of an ExpressPass user are higher than the average monthly fines paid by
an HOV violator who used the lanes an equal number of times, the reduced stress
levels (that is, no concerns over being caught) and lack of guilt associated with lawful
behavior may well suffice to tip the balance in favor of compliance. Finally, motorists
who violate the law not only risk a fine, but also risk suffering a delay when they are
pulled over by CHP officials and ticketed. For motorists who are using the Express
Lanes because they are in a hurry, this cost will be a significant deterrent to
cheating. 57 It thus appears that relative to HOV-only lanes, HOT lanes make it

rational for more motorists to comply with the law.' This compliance with the law
helps convince other law-abiding Express Lanes motorists that they are not being

duped for paying the tolls or carpooling, thereby increasing compliance all-around,
and helping to reinforce the social norm against cheating. FasTrak has successfully
turned the criminals into cops.
The ExpressPass program may influence perceptions of adherence to the law in
other ways as well. When the 1-15 Express Lanes were designated as HOV-only
lanes, it was obvious to all observant motorists that solo drivers in the Express Lanes
were violating the law. Now that these lanes have been modified to combination
HOV and toll-paying SOV lanes, motorists are likely to assume that those solo
drivers in the Express Lanes are ExpressPass users, rather than violators. While a

153. See id.
154. See supra text accompanying note 141.
155. Telephone Interview with Jay Gainer, supra note 132. Gainer reports that a significant
number of people who come into the FasTrak offices to purchase transponders admit to having
formerly been HOV cheaters.
156. Cf GODBE RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 7 (noting that FasTrak users
report that one reason they use the program is that they make more than enough money for
getting to work earlier to offset the tolls). Of course, the fact that most individuals are generally
risk-averse, see, e.g., Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1496 n. 16 (1999), suggests
that many people would prefer small, regular toll payments to large, rare tickets, even if the
annual cost of the two approaches were identical.
157. Telephone Interview with Jay Gainer, supra note 132. Gainer relays the story of a
hospital employee who would often illegally use the Express Lanes when she had to reach the
emergency room on short notice. She eventually purchased an ExpressPass because she grew
w ary of having to spend fifteen minutes arguing with CHP officers trying to convince them
that she really did need to use the lanes because of a medical emergency. Even in such
circumstances, CHP officers would usually write the ticket anyway, preferring to "letthe courts
sort it out." Id
158. I do not believe that this suggestion ends the inquiry. As I point out throughout the
Article, there are numerous instances in which drivers do not appear to be behaving rationally.
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motorist can, upon careful inspection, see whether a solo driver in the Express Lanes
is a violator (the ExpressPass Transponders usually hang from the automobile's rear
view mirror), it requires substantially more effort to determine whether someone has
an ExpressPass than it does to determine whether someone is driving alone. 5 9 Thus,
even if the program did not affect actual rates of compliance with the law, it might
well affect perceived compliance, simply by making violations more discrete. As long
as motorists know that solo drivers can legally use the Express Lanes in exchange for
a fee, as is the case in San Diego,"w this perceived compliance is likely to bring about
greater actual compliance.'
To sum up this Part, FasTrak accomplished in its first few years much of what its
proponents had hoped it would: Some SOV traffic shifted into the Express Lanes;
carpooling rates increased measurably; and the percentage of individuals using the
Express Lanes without authorization appears to have dropped precipitously.
Undoubtedly, the program has changed the traffic patterns on the San Diego
highways, almost certainly for the better. But has the program also affected the way
that residents think about commuting, their contributions to roadway congestion, and
the nature oftheir community? I will consider those questions in the Part that follows.
III. FASTRAK'S EFFECT ON NORMS
Americans' love affair with their cars is legendary. 62 Perhaps more than any other
area in the country, Southern California symbolizes the American car culture and car

159. Express Lanes cheaters are less obvious under FasTrak than they were under the
standard HOV lane system. Notably, however, this greater anonymity does not seem to have
increased noncompliance with the law, or at least if it has, this increased noncompliance has
been offset through other aspects of the program's enforcement.
160. Eighty-seven percent of 1-15 users are aware of the ExpressPass program. See
JACQUELINE GOLOB ASSOCS., supra note 106, at 7.
161. Cf Graeme S. Cooper, Analyzing Corporate Tax Evasion, 50 TAX L. REV. 33, 65
(1994) (discussing empirical studies showing "that favorable attitudes to taxpaying, which are
believed to be manifest in actual behavior, apparently are associated with the belief that others
are paying their share," and correlate with higher levels of taxpayer compliance); Kahan, supra
note 51, at 354 (noting the "strong correlation between a person's obedience and her
perception of other's behavior and attitudes toward the law"); Carlisle Ford Runge, Institutions
and the Free Rider: The Assurance Problem in Collective Action, 46 J. POL. 154, 160-61
(1984) (arguing that perceptions ofunfairness discourage individuals from contributing to the
public good when they perceive free-riding by other actors).
162. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Car Wars: The FourthAmendment'sDeath on the Highway,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 556, 576-77 (1998) (providing statistical quantification of the
American "love affair" with automobiles); David B. Rivkin, Jr., The US. "Clean" Fuels
Program:ImperativesandProspects,28 CAL. W. L. REv. 95,95 (1991-92) (taking the unique
American love affair with cars as a given).
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dependency. 63 As discussed earlier,"M that car culture has increasingly come to view
solo commuting as both a norm and an entitlement. While a loosely organized
subculture of carpoolers who question this dominant norm exists, subverting-or
even softening--the dominant norm of solo commuting is an extremely daunting
prospect. Yet that is precisely what San Diego's government has decided it must do
if it is to prevent its traffic congestion problem from reaching intolerable levels. This
Part explores the ways in which the San Diego program might successfully alter
existing norms about driving there, and how such an alteration might strengthen the
program's goals of decreasing congestion on the city's highways. It then situates the
observations about San Diego within the theoretical literature on the interplay
between norms and the law, and, more specifically, the literature on how norms
change in response to changing laws.
A. CarpoolingNorms
San Diego cannot be characterized as a city of carpoolers. Although there have
been significant increases in levels of roadway congestion during the past several
decades, most motorists' preferences for solo commuting seem to trump their
preferences for shorter commutes. The average San Diego 1-15 commuter spent, in
1996, one hour and eight minutes per day commuting to and from work. 65 Although
a carpooler using the HOV lanes might have expected to shave such a commute by
more than fifty percent, few motorists opted to carpool between 1988 and 1996.
The comments of San Diego focus group participants help emphasize the
prevalence of the solo-commuting norm:
While one respondent in the SOV group said the FasTrak program was designed
to encourage carpooling by making people pay for the privilege of not sitting in
traffic, another respondent said, "people just aren't going to carpool."'
Other respondents in [the SOV] group described FasTrak as a "failed attempt to
get carpooling to happen," saying "they should just admit it's not going to work
and open it up."' 6
Yet another respondent in the part-time user group said she felt "resentful"
because she feels there are really 6no alternatives to FasTrak for commuters who
would like to get to work faster.
The first two responses suggest deep skepticism toward the possibilities for

163. See Carol Sanger, Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of
GenderedSpace, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 705, 710-11 (1995); Keith Stone, Breaking Driving
Habits Costways CouldBe GridlockRemedy, L.A. DAILYNEWs, Aug. 4, 1996, atNI (noting
that Los Angeles motorists have "shown they would rather be disemboweled than take the
bus") (quoting Kenneth Green, Reason Found., Envtl Studies Dir.).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 13-19.
165. See WLBUR SMrrH AssoCs., supra note 50, at 10.
166. GODBE RESEARCH &ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 10.
167. Id. at 20.
168. Id at8.
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inculcating a carpooling norm in the populace. These respondents see solo
commuting as a practice that is so deeply ingrained in people's behavioral patterns
that efforts to affect those norms via the content of the law are doomed. The response
from the "resentful" motorist suggests a related but different reaction to the
programmer. Her response belies some level of cognitive dissonance. The motorist
believes that there are no alternatives to paying the toll if one wishes to reach work
more quickly, forgetting the obvious alternative ofcarpool formation. Indeed, at least
in the mind of this motorist, although 1-15 has provided carpoolers with quicker
commutes for over a decade and the respondent herself sometimes uses the Express
Lanes and is mostly surrounded by carpoolers when she does so, the carpooling
option fails to register on her radar screen.
In establishing carpool lanes along 1-15 in 1988, the San Diego local government
was trying to undermine the norm of solo driving. The program set aside a segregated
lane offering a superior service to those few individuals who were willing to break
with the dominant solo-commuting norm. The message of the lane from a public
norms perspective was very clear--every carpool potentially takes at least one car off
the roads, and as a reward for this socially beneficial decision the carpooler will enjoy
a quicker commute than the solo driver. As the general purpose lanes became more
and more congested, the incentive for individuals to carpool grew stronger and
stronger. Nevertheless, the norm of solo commuting was not undermined. 69 People
were willing to drive solo even if it meant longer commutes. Automobile seats
became more comfortable; cellular telephones became ubiquitous; people adhered to
their solo-commuting norms. The HOV lanes remained underutilized. The percentage
of motorists who carpooled never reached the critical mass that might be necessary
to provoke members of the solo-commuting majority to question their practices. 7 '
The initial data collected by SANDAG, demonstrating a measurable increase in
carpooling following the FasTrak program's implementation, suggests the possibility
of some shifts in San Diego's carpooling norms. First, the program has likely
increased the extent to which carpooling is seen as a socially useful activity. By
shifting to congestion pricing, the program has reinforced the view (already created
by the presence of carpool lanes) that carpoolers are helping society by easing
congestion on the roadway. In the minds of some, the size of the toll not charged to
carpoolers may correlate with the amount of money the carpoolers' choices are
saving the community when they decide to carpool instead of driving solo.'7 ' Again,
although carpoolers are no better off financially than they were before the program

169. Cf Oren, supranote 13, at 147 ("Carpool lanes might encourage trip reduction, but
the success of trip reduction is dependent on the occurrence of the culture change that the
program was designed to effectuate.").
170. Craig Oren notes:
[T]here are many areas of life in which the surrounding culture leads us to prefer
something other than the cheapest alternative. If I saw others successfully
carpooling or using transit to get to work, I might well be influenced to do the
same, just as my choice of car is affected by the preferences of my colleagues and
neighbors.
Id. at 198.
171. In actuality, the San Diego program is designed to raise revenues for the city, rather
than simply break even. See SCHREFFLER ETAL., supra note 96, at 4-5.
..
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was implemented, they are likely to feel better off relative to other motorists, who
must now pay a toll in order to obtain the time savings that carpoolers get for "free."
Second, the fact that individuals may now pony up several dollars in order to use
the Express Lanes does not appear to have led to any demoralization problems among
carpoolers. Carpoolers on the 1-15 are now generally supportive of the program. 72
Surprisingly, 1-15 carpoolers have even articulated the view that the price solo drivers
must pay in orderto access the Express Lanes is too high." There was some concern
priorto the program's implementation that the ExpressPass program would eliminate
the law's apparent mark of approval for carpooling and, by allowing paying solo
drivers to use the Express Lanes, blur the law's approval for carpooling.' 74 But the
increase in carpooling, combined with carpoolers' approval for the program and their
sentiment that solo drivers are being overcharged for the right to drive in the carpool
lanes, suggests just the opposite. The status of carpoolers relative to other drivers
appears, if anything, to have increased as a result of the program.
Third, the program is likely to enhance the degree to which commuters feel they
have choices in their commuting patterns.' When an ExpressPass motorist decides
to pay the toll and ride in the Express Lanes, she will probably understand the toll
charged in one of two ways: (1) the price she has to pay for a quicker commute; and
(2) the price she has to pay for not carpooling. When faced with a monetary charge
for engaging in an activity, a consumer is likely to consider whether there are
alternative behaviors that can decrease or eliminate the charge.'76 Thus, if the
commuter sees the toll as the price of a quick commute, she will consider tollavoidance options such as (a) riding in the slower, general purpose lanes; (b)
arranging her employment schedule so that she is not driving during the peak hours,
when tolls are most expensive; and (c) seeking housing that is closer to her place of
work or vise versa. If she sees the toll as the price of not carpooling, she will
consider: (d) carpooling; and (e) mass transit alternatives, which would also provide

172. See GOLOB ETAL., supra note 118, at 62.
173. See id.at 69 (noting that when access to the lanes was based on a monthly charge, most
carpoolers felt the $70 monthly fee was too high).
174. By blurring I mean to say that formerly the law said "carpoolers are making a special
contribution to reducing traffic congestion and they therefore deserve special treatment," and
no longer sends that message so clearly. Obviously, setting aside the possibilities that tolls
would be used to improve congestion, solo drivers using the carpool lanes are contributing to
traffic congestion to the same degree as solo drivers in the general purpose lanes. Thus,
allowing some solo drivers into the Express Lanes can be said to blur the law's statement that
carpoolers are worthy of special praise. For a discussion of blurring in the context of
governmental efforts to influence social norms, see Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation ofSocial
Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 1010-12 (1995).
175. See SUPERNAKETAL., supra note 95, at 26 ("Congestion pricing creates an identifiable
new travel option, which is highly valued by the participants and can be designed in a way that
protects the interest of carpoolers and keeps them satisfied."); see also Lange, supranote 150,
at BI ("[G]iving commuters more options reduces stress, making them less likely to become
frustrated or violent.").
176. While it is certainly not the case that every commuter will become a rational actor
through such a process (recall the frustrated commuter quoted above), the FasTrak program
does seem to be encouraging some of that behavior. See, e.g., supra note 155.
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access to the ExpressPass Lanes. Any of these alternatives mitigate the problems
associated with freeway congestion. The first three do so by decreasing the
consumer's expectation that she ought to be able to travel from point A to point B
quickly and easily. The second set of alternatives soften the commuter's expectation
that she has a right to commute alone. Over time, then, the availability (and use) of
these alternatives resulting from the FasTrak program is likely to decrease the power
of commuting-on-demand expectations and solo-commuting norms. Of course, this
discussion has left out alternative (f) cheating-an option that is likely to weigh
heavily on some people's minds if commutes become too slow or expensive.
B. Compliance Norms
There is some reason to believe that FasTrak will increase social sanctions against
cheating. The increase in Express Lanes traffic may discourage unauthorized use of
the lanes. As many people have observed, motorists stuck in traffic become quite
frustrated when they see nearly empty HOV lanes.'77 It is plausible that this
frustration and an associated belief that HOV-dedicated lanes constitute a waste of
freeway space 78 encourages solo motorists to break the law by riding in HOV lanes.
By increasing the amount of traffic in the ExpressPass lanes, FasTrak is likely to
diminish the frequency with which motorists feel such frustration. FasTrak is a
reasonably popular government program, 79 and it is a local program with local
roots, 8 hence the norm against undermining it is likely to be rather strong.'' This
heightened respect for the purpose of the lanes could eventually translate into a
heightened acceptance of the fact that carpoolers (as the main beneficiaries of the
lane) arejustified in receiving favorable treatment.8 2 Moreover, as cheating becomes

177. See, e.g., supra note 36.
178. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 167.
179. See SUPERNAK ET AL., supra note 95, at 28 ("Forty-seven percent of 1-15 commuters
responding to the Attitudinal Panel Survey thought the program was a success while 27 percent
did not think the program was a success.").
180. Because the program's origins (if not its funding) are distinctly local in nature,
FasTrak's has avoided the political pitfalls that might be associated with such a program if it
were perceived to have been foisted upon San Diego by officials in Washington or Sacramento.
Such was not the case with the Los Angeles "diamond lanes," where the perception that the
program was imposed upon the city by federal bureaucrats helped prompt a firestorm of
opposition. See supra note 46.
181. Of course, were the public to begin believing that charging some motorists for access
to the Express Lanes is unjust, attempts to undermine the charging aspect of the program by
riding in the Express Lanes without authorization might become more frequent. However, at
present this aspect of the program is actually quite popular. See GOLOBETAL., supra note 118,
at 63 ("Ninety percent of current ExpressPass users think ExpressPass is fairto travelers on the
regular lanes of 1-15, while... 70 percent of other I-15 users.., think it is fair."); JACQUELINE
GOLOB Assocs., supranote 106, at 9. The program's popularity increased among both users
and nonusers during the life of the program. See SUPERNAK ETAL., supra note 95, at 36.
182. SANDAG has not collected data that would measure the prevalence of this response.
However, one piece of polling data supports the inference that carpoolers are perceived as the
most deserving users of the Express Lanes. When polled about what the government should
do ifthe lanes become too crowded, respondents were given the options of raising ExpressPass
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decreasingly common, the social sanctions against cheaters and the feelings of shame
that violators experience will become more pronounced.' Thus, even if heightened
enforcement is the only reason for decreased cheating on the Express Lanes, there is
reason to believe that the norm against cheating will still become stronger, since
heightened enforcement will be necessary if any government is to make congestion
pricing work.'
A second effect on enforcement norms may result from FasTrak. When the 1-15
Express Lanes were dedicated to carpools and carpools alone, a solo motorist had to
incur a small risk of being assessed a $271 fine ifhe wished to use the Express Lanes.
The choice was binary: Reach one's destination slowly or risk a large fine. Under
FasTrak, the impatient motorist for whom riding in the slow lanes is unacceptable has
two options: Pay a fee of approximately $2 or pay nothing and risk a $271 fine. In
such circumstances, amotorist's calculus may be as follows: "If I am caught and have
to pay the $271 fine, I will feel quite foolish because I could have gotten to my
destination just as quickly had I paid the $2 charge." FasTrak cheaters who do get
caught will likely experience a level of regret not experienced by one whose choice
was binary. In other words, the HOV cheater who is caught will rationalize his
decision in the following manner: "I really had no choice but to break the law, since
I had to make it to that meeting on time." In contrast, a FasTrak cheater will think:
"I was really stupid. I should have played it safe and paid the toll." Assuming
motorists want to avoid these feelings of regret and the disutility that can be expected
to accompany them, we might expect the development of a norm that holds FasTrak
cheating to be an instance not only of lawbreaking, but of foolishness.8 5 As long as

fees or increasing the number of people who would need to occupy a vehicle in order for it to
qualify as a carpool from two to three, 56% of I-15 commuter respondents said fees should be
raised while only 28% said carpool occupancy requirements should be increased. See GOLOB
ET AL., supra note 118, at 78. In contrast, San Diego commuters who drive the 1-8 corridor,
which only has carpool lanes, were asked the same questions about the 1-15 lanes and
congestion. By a 46% to 42% margin, these commuters favored increasing the occupancy
requirement. See id Although there may be differences among 1-8 and 1-15 commuters that
help explain these different attitudes, one interpretation of this data is that exposure to the
ExpressPass program increases solo drivers' political support/empathy for carpoolers.
183. Richard McAdams proposes this connection, with fear of losing status providing the
internal linkages:
Because esteem is relative, the intensity of disesteem directed at those who
engage in a disapproved behavior is partly a function of the total number of
people who are thought to engage in that behavior. If twenty percent of the
population is thought to violate the initial norm against smoking or fur, then
violating [the] norm will place one in the bottom quintile of the group with
respect to that criterion of esteem. But if only two percent are believed to be
smokers or fur vearers, then one falls to the bottom two percent for that criteria.
Other things being equal, the latter represents a greater esteem cost than the
former; the more deviant the violation, the more it appalls group sentiment.
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,Development, andRegulationofNorms, 96 MICH. L. REV.
338, 366-67 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
184. See supratext accompanying notes 144-46.
185. Indeed, the same framing effect is likely to affect the perceptions of motorists who
observe FasTrak violators pulled over by the side of the road. They may well think to
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enforcement involves a singling out of violating motorists, this anticipated
shift in
86
enforcement norms can be expected to produce heightened compliance.'
FasTrak may also influence social norms in a third, related way. Breaking the law
is sometimes lionized, or at least tolerated, as an act of defiance against an unpopular
rule.1 7 In violating an unpopular law, criminals can sometimes tap into a wellspring
of social forgiveness, especially where many in society perceive that, had they been
in the criminal's shoes, they too would have broken the law.' When the option set
of an individual is constrained in a manner that seems to place him between a rock
and a hard place, there may be sympathy for his decision to violate the law.'89

themselves, "Just think, he risked a $271 fine in order to avoid a $2 toll. How silly." On the
other hand, it is plausible to think that if the lane were reserved for HOV lanes only, other
motorists will look at the pulled over violator and think "Well, someone must have been in a
big hurry."
186. Note that this mechanism throws into sharp relief one potential drawback to fully
automated enforcement, which SANDAG is currently testing. Under the current partially
automated system of enforcement, visual inspections by law enforcement personnel are
combined with inspections by toll managers. When toll managers observe a motorist driving
in an unauthorized lane, they have the capacity to signal CHP patrol vehicles, which will then
track down and ticket the offending motorist. If all enforcement is done through surveillance
cameras and tickets are served upon violators via U.S. mail, then the shame associated with
being pulled over will be a nonfactor. As a result, one might anticipate a marginally weaker
social sanction against cheating. Because of technical glitches in the various automated
enforcement systems that SANDAG is testing, it is not anticipated that fully automated
enforcement will be a reality for at least three to five years. Telephone Interview with Jay
Gainer, supra note 132.
It is also worth noting that totally automated enforcement would save violators time.
Currently, the time required to deal with law enforcement personnel if one is caught cheating
helps deter would-be cheating motorists who are, after all, considering illegally using the
Express Lanes because they feel pressed for time. Automating the delivery of tickets thus
decreases the cost of punishment to the hurried motorist. See supra text accompanying note
157.
187. Cf Dan M. Kahan, PrivatizingCriminalLaw:StrategiesforPrivateNorm Enforcement

in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859, 1863-64 (1999).
Decades of abuse and neglect have created deep-seated distrust of the police in
inner cities. Severe penalties, which decimate both the lives of individual
offenders and the communities from which they come, have bred even more
resentment. Against the background of these sensibilities, cooperating with police
in their fight against gangs becomes freighted with connotations of collaboration
and betrayal. So citizens refuse to cooperate.
Id.; see also Margolis, supra note 45, at 829 ("[T]here is ordinarily a spectrum, not a
dichotomy between compliance and noncompliance. .

.

. []']here are at least two

dimensions--1) partial compliance and (2) good, or at least not obviously bad, excuses for
noncompliance-which blur the line between socially acceptable and socially perverse
behavior and allow the gradual erosion of a norm.").
188. For an interesting discussion of this phenomenon, and its effects within African
American communities, see generally Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its
Lawbreakers,anda Politics of Identification,65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1769, 1777-81 (1992).
189. Perhaps the highest profile example of this phenomenon is Dr. Jack Kevorkian, whose
illegal efforts to help terminally ill patients end their lives received a great deal of support from
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FasTrak provides the hurried driver with a commuting option that will allow him to
reach his destination on time without breaking the law. By expanding the option set
in this manner, the program may cast cheating as a less legitimate form of defiance.
Accordingly, FasTrak may diminish the legitimacy of defying the law, and may thus
increase the social opprobrium directed at lawbreakers. 1 0 In short, by allowing
motorists to buy into the HOV lanes, FasTrak gives people a more attractive
alternative to breaking the law. The San Diego government alters motorists'
incentives, and does so in a way that strengthens norms against lawbreaking. The
program's goals and its effect on norms reinforce each other-a recipe for a highly
successful government program.
C. Road-PricingNorms
Prior to the beginning of the FasTrak program, city residents had become attached
to the notion that freeways were to be free. As one report described it, FasTrak would
fly "in the face of a public which fosters mores that argue against the pricing of
highways and the selling of limited highway space to a select group."' 9 ' Although in
some areas of the country, particularly the New England and Mid-Atlantic states,
traditional reliance on turnpikes has helped weaken resistance to the introduction of
new toll lanes, in areas of the country such as San Diego, where residents have little
experience with toll roads, planners seeking to introduce them are likely to encounter
stiff opposition.' 92
At the same time, this baseline opposition to the concept of toll roads did not soften
the interest of solo drivers in being able to buy their way into the carpool lanes. Prior
to the initiation of the FasTrak advertising campaign, San Diego city planners were
heartened to learn that "[flrequent commuters were extremely enthusiastic about
being allowed access to the HOV lanes during peak travel times. Seven in ten

those who felt the law left those who wished to avoid long, painful deaths little choice but to
turn to Kevorkian.
190. Robert Ellickson has suggested to me that a parallel dynamic surrounded social norms
in the wake of the Eighteenth Amendment's enactment and repeal. In many quarters,
Prohibition's unpopularity made it socially acceptable for an individual to keep an illegal
liquor still in his backyard; many Americans replaced store-bought alcohol with home-brewed
varieties. However, once Prohibition ended, meaning that people could again buy alcohol in
liquor stores and at bars, owning a liquor still-which remained contraband even after the end
of Prohibition-became much less socially acceptable behavior. As the law became less rigid,
defiance of it was perceived to be less justified.
191. GODBE RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, supranote 105, at 5.
192. Cf Federal Highway Admin., supra note 117, at 8 ("Gaining public support for
congestion pricing in Portland is particularly challenging given the absence ofany toll facilities
or HOV lanes ....
"). To some extent, congestion-pricing schemes may be able to piggyback
on consumers' familiarity with congestion-pricing schemes in other contexts. For example, a
Florida community that is considering implementing a congestion-pricing scheme on a wellused bridge is banking on such behavior translation. See id. at 6 ("Lee County hopes to
encourage the large senior citizen population (25 percent of the area's population), which is
familiar with 'early bird' specials in purchasing other services, to take advantage of the offpeak [driving] discounts.").
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participants expressed a 'very' or 'somewhat' favorable impression of the buy-in
program."' 93 By the end of the program's first year, the concept of charging Express
Lanes users had won the support of most 1-15 commuters. Ninety percent of
ExpressPass users and seventy percent of other 1-15 users felt that the program was
fair to those who used the general purpose (free) lanes of I-15.'
At first glance, these two sets of views-that the freeways should be free, and that
allowing some motorists to buy into the HOV lanes is fair-would seem to be
contradictory, and one might begin to ask difficult questions about polling
methodology and question phrasing. However, upon close examination, the positions
prove reconcilable. In San Diego the freeway capacity devoted to SOV traffic was not
diminished by the FasTrak program. The initial HOV lanes were constructed as
additions to the preexisting 1-15 highway. Single-occupant vehicles were never
allowed to use the lanes prior to 1996. Thus, no one who had previously gotten a
privilege for free was ever deprived of something by the FasTrak program.
Admittedly, FasTrak may prevent the conversion of the Express Lanes into general
purpose (free) lanes, but this potential harm to SOV motorists is probably too
attenuated to spark any perceived welfare loss. However, were the FasTrak program
to be extended to the general purpose lanes, or were carpoolers to be charged or
required to carry additional occupants,' 95 then fierce opposition to the program might
96
well coalesce.
Some opponents of congestion-pricing schemes argue that the program
disproportionately benefits the wealthy at the expense of the poor. 97 Even though it
appears that wealthier commuters are indeed the primary ExpressPass users,'98 San
Diego's residents have not been terribly receptive to the critique. The print news
media in San Diego by-and-large did not pursue the elitism angle on the program,
although this criticism was the most common basis for the rare negative television or
radio story. 199 This lack of attention to the equity concerns suggests the absence of a

193. WILBUR SMITH Assocs., supranote 50, at 7.
194. See supra note 181.
195. By this I mean that three passengers or two drivers might be required in order for a
carpool to continue obtaining free access to the Express Lanes. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that a large number of 1-15 carpools consist of parents driving their school-aged children.
Telephone Interview with Karyn Menpink, supra note 143; see also SAMUEL, supra note 26,
at 4 (noting that, nationally, "[o]ver half of carpoolers now seem to be family members").
Rewarding these vehicles with speedier commutes seems defensible as a pro-family or proeducation measure, but it is hard to justify as an anti-congestion policy, since the children are
ineligible to drive.
196. See supratext accompanying notes 78-79.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69.
198. See, e.g., GOLOB ET AL., supranote 118, at 15 (noting that 50% of ExpressPass users
versus 20% of all 1-15 motorists have household incomes in excess of $100,000).
199. See SUPERNAK ET AL., supra note 124, at 6-8. The one time-period during which the
equity critique did acquire some salience with the public occurred when SANDAG attempted
to raise the price of the monthly passes from $70 to $80. See JACQUELINE GOLOB AssoCS.,
supra note 106, at 11. This increase followed shortly on the heels of an increase from $50 to
$70. However, the move to variable (per use) charging seems to have softened this criticism,
since middle-class drivers can easily afford to use the Lanes at least occasionally.
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strong egalitarian norm when it comes to roadway use.2' Indeed, the discourse on the
equity issue in San Diego was surprisingly muted and shallow. For example, no one
ever questioned the equity of allowing drivers to buy their way into lanes that are
much safer than the general purpose 1-15 lanes, which the Express Lanes almost
certainly are.2 ' Admittedly, roadway safety is something of a luxury good in that
newer, higher-priced vehicles generally come with special safety features such as
antilock brakes and side-impact airbags. Nevertheless, one suspects that had the
promotional effort for FasTrak emphasized the lives saved, rather than the time saved,
by those paying the Express Lanes toll, such a campaign could have offended existing
norms.20 2 Moreover, there may be significant interjursidictional variations in the
degree to which consumers respond to the equity-oriented critique of congestion
pricing. For example, in Minneapolis-St.Paul, local officials pulled the plug on a
candidate railed against the
HOT lane demonstration project after a gubernatorial
20 3
"Lexus Lane" approach to congestion management.
That this "Lexus Lane" moniker has had a bit of saliency in public discourse
suggests that the egalitarian critique does tap into some level of public uneasiness
about FasTrak and similar programs.2' By selling preferential treatment to some

200. Cf Ward Elliot, Editorial, Toll Lanes Aren't Elitist; They're Smooth Riding for All,

L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 1995, at B9 ("Nobody gripes about express mail or faxes or tries to ban
them as 'Lexus mail' that 'prices the poor out of the fast lane.' HOT lanes are the same: They
get everyone where they want to go faster and they slow no one down."). Elliot's editorial
raises an interesting question concerning how roadways are perceived. For some public goods,
strong egalitarian norms urge against giving to those, who are willing to pay, a more superior
product. An interesting illustration involves public education. In many states, public education
funding comes largely from local property taxes, and significant variations among school
district resources result. In recent years, the supreme courts of several states have struck down
these disparities as violating their respective state constitutions. See, e.g., Helena Elementary
School Dist. v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). In other states, these disparities have withstood constitutional
challenges. See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 746 (Ohio 1997). At its core, this
dispute over school funding is about whether parents should be able to buy into districts that
will provide their children with superior public educational institutions, or whether students
of all backgrounds must receive equal public education resources.
201. A California Highway Patrol officer reports that she is only aware of one collision in
the Express Lanes since the initiation of the program. Telephone Interview with Karyn
Menpink, supranote 143. Police officers are not the only ones who perceive that the Express
Lanes are much safer than the general purpose lanes. Eighty-three percent of ExpressPass users
say that those lanes are safer than the main lanes. See SUPERNAK ET AL., supranote 95, at 22.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 313-16.
203. See FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADNMIN., supra note 62, at 4.
204. Indeed, whenever the government imposes new user fees or raises existing ones there
will be some chance that the egalitarian argument will be aired. See generally Clayton P.
Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, FederalUserFees: A Legaland EconomicAnalysis, 67 B.U.

L. REV. 795, 814-18 (1987). In some instances, government concerns about deterring lowerincome citizens from using the resource may convince the government to rely on another
means of allocating access to the resource. See id. For example, the government might feel that
inner-city youths would benefit the most from visiting national parks, and this concern might
prevent it from raising entry fees-even though those who save on their entry fees as a result
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motorists the FasTrak program has the potential to heighten class stratification on the
roadway.205 Whereas formerly every solo driver was in the "same boat" in dealing
with roadway congestion, those who value their time the most and have the resources
to purchase a ticket in the fast lane now have the ability to do so. Whereas it formerly
seemed strange to see solo drivers mired in gridlock while carpoolers zipped
alongside them, it rarely seemed unjust. In the minds of some, the same cannot be
said when the relevant difference between the stalled motorist and the speeding
motorist is a resource constraint. Indeed, resentment of the have-nots is not the only
factor at play here. When San Diego created a focus group ofmotorists whose income
exceeded $50,000, its members expressed a common concern about "what other
motorists might think of them driving on the toll road."2" These motorists were
concerned that using the ExpressPass was a potentially ostentatious display of
wealth-a signal to the world that they saw themselves as better than the gridlocked
rabble.
Based on the limited notes from the focus group it is difficult to determine whether
these motorists were likely to be deterred from using the ExpressPasses because of
a sense of guilt or because of a fear that using the lanes might cause people who know
the driver to see him as a snob or a wastrel. While these sentiments were undoubtedly
heartfelt, it is important not to read too much into this singular display of focus-group
angst. Similar expressions did not appear in either the private or public discourse
concerning the FasTrak program. Moreover, it seems plausible that some number of
people would be attracted to using the lanes precisely because doing so represents
conspicuous consumption. This possible counter-effect underscores the oddity that
"Lexus Lanes" is meant to conjure up indignation. The epithet has rhetorical force
only because the association between a Lexus automobile and wealth is clear in the
public mind. It suggests that automobiles are already used by some people to
distinguish themselves from their fellow motorists. 7 Buying aLexus is an expressive

of this decision will primarily be the middle and upper class families who are the parks'
primary users. In such instances, a more sensible strategy might be to raise user fees on
everyone and utilize these revenues to fund a program that busses inner-city youths to the
parks and pays for their entire entry fees.
205. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.PA. L. REV. 2021,
2037-38 (1996) ("There is often a connection between norms that block exchanges and ideas
about equal citizenship. The exchange can be barred by social norms because of a perception
that, while there may be disparities in social wealth, the spheres in which people are very
unequal ought not to invade realms of social life in which equality is a social norm or goal.").
206. Harry W. Richardson & Chang-Hee Christine Bae, The Equity Impacts of Road
Congestion Pricing,in ROAD PRICING, supra note 27, at 247, 257.
207. See David Thoms, Motor Car Ownership in Twentieth-Century Britain:A Matter of
Convenience oraMarque ofStatus?, in THE MOTOR CAR AND POPULAR CULTURE INTHE 20TH
CENTURY, supra note 17, at 41, 47.

Most importantly, however, the motor car differentiates on a personal basis;
through their particular characteristics cars interact with the individual, perhaps
in terms of a status (or inverted status) relationship with the external world, or
merely through internalised self-identification. How else does one explain the
purchase of high-powered cars with the capacity to far exceed the maximum legal
speed? Similarly, why are 4 x 4 vehicles in such demand when so many of them
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act, and part of its expressive content is a statement that the driver is well-off." 8 This
analysis suggests that the content of the "Lexus Lanes" objection probably has more
to do with concerns about equity than concerns about status.
A final observation on this subject is worth mentioning briefly. It is notable that the
San Diego project does not go "all the way" toward commodifying access to the
Express Lanes. One variation on the program would allow all spaces in the Express
Lanes to be fully alienable. In an ideal system, carpoolers could pass through a gate
that provided them with one permit to use the Express Lanes, which could then be
sold to another motorist for a mutually agreeable price. The carpooler could then dart
into the general purpose lanes a couple of dollars richer. Obviously, the transaction
costs of such an approach would be prohibitive, as uncongested highway conditions
are not conducive to this kind of haggling. But such a trading system could be
accomplished more effectively in one of three ways: Carpoolers would receive a
voucher, which could then be sold to a motorist for use during a subsequent trip.2"
Alternatively, and preferably, the carpooler could receive a payment or tax credit
from the government for each trip made in the general purpose lanes equivalent to the
amount of the toll (or some percentage thereof). This would allow carpoolers who
20
value money more than the benefits of the Express Lanes to maximize their utility. '
21
Such a program could conceivably even increase revenue to the government. Still,
the fact that policymakers in San Diego have not given consideration to such a system
more
has less to do with the policy challenges inherent in such an approach, 212 and
23
to do with their reluctance to commodify carpooling behavior completely.

hardly ever forsake the tarmac? Cars are more than simply a means of transport
since for many people they represent an extension of personality.
Id. at 46-47.
208. See Holden, supranote 17, at 33 ("In other countries social divisions such as class can
be symbolised by car and models .... In Italy for example, 'Fiats are for the masses, Lancias
for the professional classes, Alfa Romeos for the trendies and Ferraris for the rich."') (quoting
Stuart Marshall, The Best ofBoth Worlds: StuartMarshallon Why Jaguarand FordNeed One
Another, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1989, at Weekend FT, 9).
209. In order to meet programmatic objectives, the voucher would have to be good for some
amount of toll, rather than one free trip on the lanes. Recall that the tolls on 1-15 are set
according to the level of congestion in the Express Lanes at any given moment. Thus a voucher
earned by a 5:30 P.M. weekday carpooler should typically be worth more than avoucher earned
by a 4:00 P.M. weekday carpooler.
210. Of course, the fee and bonus structure would have to be arranged such that it would not
actually encourage socially inefficient carpooling. For example, one can imagine
entrepreneurial duos of teenagers driving fuel-efficient cars between downtown and the
suburbs during rush hours in orderto collect these carpooling bonuses. Obviously, encouraging
such trips would be counterproductive.
211. The dynamic effect ofthe program would be as follows: The exodus ofsome carpoolers
would decrease traffic and lower tolls in the Express Lanes, thereby prompting new motorists
to enter the toll lanes. Eventually, the expected equilibrium would involve a higher percentage
of solo motorists in the Express Lanes. The revenue from these paying customers could be
used to offset the bonuses flowing to carpoolers using the general purpose lanes.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 209-10.
213. One scholar has advocated the use of tradable driving permits to relieve traffic
congestion, but the idea has not caught on, presumably because of concerns about the
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IV. APPLYING THE SAN DIEGO CASE STUDY
TO THE NORMS DEBATE

The San Diego 1-15 experiment is a rich resource for researchers interested in
matters oftransportation policy, the effects ofuser fees, the role of technology in law
enforcement, and a number of other topics. My primary interest in the FasTrak
program, however, concerns the way in which it influences social norms among San
Diego's commuters. Specifically, this Partwill focus on how the transition from HOV
lanes to HOT lanes influenced three kinds of norms: (1) norms governing mode of
commuting (solo commuting versus carpooling); (2) norms relating to compliance
with the law and the social acceptability of cheating; and (3) norms governing
equitable access to roadways. The Part then proceeds to a discussion of what the
FasTrak case study teaches us about the emissions trading debate. If the FasTrak
results are indicative, it suggests that the commodification of a right to pollute will
have much more positive consequences for social norms relating to pollution than
most scholars currently believe.
A. InteractionsBetween
Norms andLaws

During this decade the academic debate on norm creation, norms as agents ofsocial
control, and interactions between norms and laws has burgeoned. However, following
in the footsteps of Robert Ellickson's foundational work on cattle ranching in Shasta
County,2" 4 much of the recent academic discussion on social norms has focused on
close-knit communities of repeat players.215 Indeed, there are excellent reasons to

transaction costs involved. See H.C. Goddard, OptimalRestrictionson Vehicle Usefor Urban
SustainabilityforMexico City, 7 INT'L J. ENV'T & POLLUTION 357 (1997).

214. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON,

ORDER WrITHOUT LAW: HOWNEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES

177 (1991) ("The hypothesis predicts that welfare-maximizing norms emerge in close-knit
settings but is agnostic about whether such norms can emerge in other social settings."); see
also Lewis A. Komhauser, Are There Cracks in the Foundationsof Spontaneous Order?,67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 652 (1992) (reviewing ELLICKSON, supra) ("Ellickson['s] ... claim
primarily applies to the substantive norms of closely knit groups."); Mark A. Lemley,
Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JURIMTRrIuCS J. 311, 314 (1995) ("It is no accident that
Ellickson's examples of private ordering tend to occur in small, close-knit, insular
communities. For example, no one would argue thatNew York City could be governed without
laws."); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales,
Emission TradesandEcosystems, 83 MINN.L.REv. 129, 157 (1998) ("In most contexts, norms
are associated with relatively small communities-'close-knit groups,' as they are called by
Robert Ellickson ... ."). For an analysis of the influence of Ellickson's work on legal
scholarship, see generally R. Brent Walton, Ellickson "sParadox: It's Suicide To Maximize

Welfare, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 153, 156 (1999) ("Ellickson's hypothesis has been very
influential as norms and human practices become the focus of legal theory. It has begun to take
hold as a building block beside Coase's theorum in the 'law and economics' movement of
today.").
215. See, for example, Fikret Berkes, Success and Failure in Marine CoastalFisheriesof
Turkey, in MAKiNG THE COMMONs WORK 161 (Daniel W. Bromley et al. eds., 1992), which
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begin with the norms of close-knit groups: Relatively speaking, these groups can be
studied easily and exhaustively. Moreover, the effects of norms are most likely to be
visible in communities where everyone knows everyone else. Thus, it makes sense
to study social norms where they are likely to be most prominent.
Unfortunately, little work appears to have been done with respect to social norms
21 6
among anonymous individuals who have little expectation of being repeat players.
Yet these kinds of environments are precisely the ones in which many of us spend
much of our time, many of our social ills are most likely to arise, and in which
government efforts to inculcate norms are potentially the most effective. This case
study of the San Diego highways represents an effort to study norm formation and
norm transformation in a loose-knit environment.
The highways of an urban metropolis are perhaps the antithesis of Shasta County's
ranches. A repeat player on a San Diego freeway is someone who tailgates you for
more than two minutes. Drivers rarely communicate with each other except to
indicate a lane change. Vehicles provide protective casings that seal off the

focuses on social norms within small, close-knit Turkish communities. Lisa Bernstein's work
on the commercial norms governing the grain and feed industry seems to focus mostly on
communities of repeat players. Even her discussion of "end-game" situations, in which the
parties have resolved not to deal with each other again, mentions a number of reputational
concerns that come into play because of the parties' concerns about future contracts with third
parties. See Lisa Bernstein, MerchantLaw in a Merchant Court:Rethinking the Code's Search

for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1788 (1996). Eric A. Posner, Law,
Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996), is perhaps most

symptomatic of the tendency to focus on close-knit groups while ostensibly referencing the
influence of norms in societies more generally. References to "village gossips" occur
throughout Posner's text. See id
216. A notable exception is in the area of norms governing the Internet, which has sparked
a great deal of interesting scholarship. See, e.g., Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation,
Government Regulation, or Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contractingfor

Governance in Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475, 519-21 (1997); David R.
Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-TheRise ofLaw in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1367, 1388-91 (1996); Lemley, supra note 214, at 313-14. However, within this literature,
there seems to be significant disagreement over whether the Internet can be perceived as a
close-knitgroup in which social sanctions will be effective. See Gibbons, supra,at 521 ("There
is some question about the extent to which individuals establish continuing relationships in
cyberspace."); see also Lemley, supra note 214, at 313 ("Informal social norms worked fairly
well when the Internet community was small and relatively insular. As a result ofthe explosive
growth of the Net in the last ten years, however, the established social order of the Internet is
breaking down.") (footnote omitted).
Outside of the Internet context, the literature on norms among non-close-knit groups is
rather sparse. Chapter 15 of Order Without Law discusses the functioning of norms in urban
areas where "the neighborhood gossip channels that are an important element of informalcontrol systems" are relatively weak. ELLICKSON, supra note 214, at 270 n.13. Quite selfconsciously, however, the focus there is on neighbors within an urban setting, not strangers in
an urban setting, where the control of norms is likely to be at its weakest. Lawrence Lessig's
discussion of norms surrounding the use of motorcycle helmets in Soviet Russia is a notable
example, in that it discusses a national norm and the government's varying efforts to
manipulate it. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 174, at 964.

1274

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 75:1231

occupants. With the aid of tinted windows, drivers can make themselves virtually
anonymous to other motorists.2 1 7 Except upon close inspection it is virtually
impossible to see the face of the driver of an offending vehicle. Even motorists who
commute via roughly the same route to work every day are unlikely to encounter the
same drivers during subsequent trips. Moreover, the sheer number of vehicles on the
roads during commuting hours and the popularity of some models of cars makes it
unlikely that one will recognize a motorist who egregiously violated driving norms
during a subsequent encounter. This anonymity helps account for the random nature
of many acts of "road rage." Typically, these violent acts are provoked by relatively
normal driving behavior. But to motorists who feel they have endured years of
rudeness on the roads, these acts are the straws that break the camel's back and lead
to extreme violence directed against the hapless victims."'
Despite the lack of repeat players, there are strongly embedded norms of highway
behavior that seem to be universal, at least within the United States. For example,
slower traffic typically travels in the right lanes on almost any multilane road. Cutting
another motorist off, especially without the use of a turn signal, is always considered
rude. And of course, solo commuting to work via automobile is very much the norm
in every major city save New York. These norms are reinforced by government
policies and difficult to alter.
Lawrence Lessig has observed that one of the ways in which the government can
help influence norms is by casting an activity that was formerly viewed as an
individual choice with individual consequences as one that creates negative
externalities. This strategy has enjoyed considerable success in the context of
government efforts to influence smoking norms:
The views about second-hand smoke "turned the distaste of smoke into a positive
source of exclusion. The smoker [became] on the defens[e] as the act of smoking
[was] increasingly banished from many social circles and the smoker so
frequently admonished not to smoke." Together, these two changes have resulted
in a"dranatic change in the social acceptability oftobacco smoking. Smokers feel
condemned, isolated, disenfranchised, alienated."2 9

217. License plates do allow for offending motorists to be identified, but only with the
assistance of the state. The state makes license plate ownership information available only for
certain purposes, largely related to law enforcement. At the present, a request to learn the
identity of a rude driver will not be granted by state governments, perhaps for fear of sparking
violent self-help. Interestingly, the use of customized/vanity license plates can be seen as an
effort by some drivers to decrease their own anonymity on the roads.
218. See Vest et al., supra note 150, at 23.
219. Lessig, supranote 174, at 1029 (alterations in original) (first internal quotation quoting
Joseph R. Gusfield, The SocialSymbolism ofSmoking andHealth,in SMOKING POLICY: LAWS,
POLITICS, AND CULTURE 49,60 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., Oxford 1993))

(second internal quotation quoting Robert A. Kagan &Jerome H. Skolnick, BanningSmoking:
Compliance WithoutEnforcement,in SMOKING POLICY: LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE, supra,
at 69, 79); see also Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Revision ofNorms, 100 ETHICS 756, 762 (1990)

("Also, consider the norms governing smoking in public places. It is still the case in many
countries in the world, perhaps in most, that smoking in public places is presumed permitted
unless otherwise indicated. But there are now several states in the United States, and many
[other] institutions, where the situation has been reversed, whether formally or informally.
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When smoking had been simply a matter of "his preference for smoking versus her
preference for a smoke-free environment," it became difficult to ostracize the smoker
for his behavior. But when the smoker was seen as imposing a higher risk of disease
upon nonsmokers in public spaces, the smoker became the antagonist, and antismoking norms evolved.' 2
The San Diego FasTrak program can be seen as a way of casting solo commuting
in terms similar to smoking, albeit in a more subtle way. Solo commuting is an
activity that contributes to roadway congestion and increases air pollution. But the
problem is that the norm of solo commuting is so firmly engrained in the minds of the
public that they do not perceive themselves as part of the problem."2 Indeed, they
perceive congestion as a problem, but view solo commuting as an individual choice
with individual consequences. The establishment of separate HOV lanes did little to
undermine this norm. It simply established the principle that, in the government's
eyes, carpooling was superior to solo commuting, and carpoolers would therefore be
rewarded with time savings. FasTrak arguably has attacked the solo-commuting norm
more clearly. How so? One way it does this is through the pricing
mechanism-ExpressPass holders learn quickly that each additional car on the
Express Lanes raises the chance thatthe toll will rise incrementally. Commuters' tolls
rise whenever a fellow commuter joins the commuting fray. Thus, the contribution
of each driver to increased traffic congestion is monetized, and the contribution of
each driver to congestion is reinforced. A second way the program expresses an anti
solo-commuting norm is that for those drivers in the general purpose lanes, FasTrak
makes carpooling appear relatively more attractive in that carpoolers now earn
monetary benefits and time savings relative to solo commuters in the general purpose
lanes. This dynamic is the flip side of the perceived welfare gains enjoyed by
carpoolers relative to everyone else.mn
One reason that FasTrak is unlikely to be able to transform commuting norms

Smoking in what is considered public space is presumed forbidden, unless explicitly
designated as smoking areas (or when explict permission is given)."). Of course, with the
smoking example, the government was an important, but by no means the only, entity that
helped shape norms. Nongovemment organizations and anti-smoking activists laid the
groundwork for the norm shift and ultimately brought the political force to bear that swayed
the government to act. Indeed, in any representative democracy, the instances in which
government is truly in the forefront of shaping norms will be rare. Unless there is a political
constituency urging government to shape norms in a certain direction, government actors will
rarely try to alter an existing popular norm, no matter how inefficient that norm might be. But
before they successfully enlist the government, these constituencies will almost certainly have
engaged in some private efforts to influence norms. By contrast, in a more autocratic
government, such as Singapore, the government can and does lead in shaping norms by, for
example, attaching huge economic and social sanctions to littering.
220. Similar efforts to focus on the externalities involved with smoking-such as an
emphasis on the health harms suffered by the children of parents who smoke at home, and the
recent lawsuits against tobacco companies to recover state Medicaid expenditures resulting
from smoking--can be seen as the continuation of this assault on the view of smoking as an
individual choice with individual consequences.
221. See supra text accompanying note 27.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
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completely is that solo commuting is still so pervasive. Here again, the comparison
with smoking is instructive. Levels of smoking in the United States reached 40% in
19 6 5 ,2"l but it has never been the case that a majority ofAmericans were smokers. On
the other hand, the overwhelming majority of employed San Diego residents are solo
commuters.224 FasTrak may prompt some solo commuters to recognize the costs they
impose on their fellow motorists. But as long as they continue to see the vast majority
of their fellow drivers engaging in solo commuting, the primary sanction for solo
commuting will be governmental (via a charge), rather than social.'
A second reason helps explain why commuting norm transformation is an uphill
battle. Although the costs of roadway congestion are significant, it may well be that
carpooling is not the most efficient solution for many motorists. For example, it will
be inefficient for some workers, especially those with extremely variable hours or
idiosyncratic commute routes, to carpool or take mass transit to reach work. The same
may be true for workers who need to drive during work hours or who derive
significant utility gains from spending time alone in their cars. 26 A large number of
motorists may see themselves as falling into one of these categories. Accordingly,
they simply will not respond to the government's statements that the solo-commuting
norm is undesirable, and can be expected to resist efforts to undermine the dominant
7
norm.

22

For these reasons, the FasTrak program, which penalizes solo commuting, but gives
solo drivers an alternative as to how they wish to pay the penalty (time or money),
may be an effective first or second step in the effort to inculcate carpooling norms.
Heavy handed mechanisms-such as large tolls charged to all solo commuters, or
public campaigns labeling solo commuters as environmental criminals-would
certainly spur a backlash. 28 As Lessig notes in the smoking context:
What is required for the inducements not to backfire is that punishments be
proportional and that there be alternatives or accommodations for smokers. This
reduces the cost of the emerging norm, and hence makes it easier for the
nonsmoker to feel justified in enforcing the nonsmoking norm. To make the
transition smoothly, both the enforcers and the deviants must be able to treat each
other less as "criminals," and more "as errant family members."" 9

223. See Joshua A. Lerner, Comment, Snuffing out a National Symbol What the United
States Can Learnfrom France'sNew No-Smoking Law, 4 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 165,
173 (1993).
224. See supra note 101.
225. See supra note 170
226. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 18.

227. See generally Lessig, supra note 174, at 1030 ("Like surfers, legislators.., who wish
to change everyday social norms must wait for signs of a rising wave of cultural support,
catching it at just the right time.") (quoting Kagan & Skolnick, supra note 219, at 69, 79).
228. A modest law will often be more effective at altering social norms and hence will
further the law's objective more than a sweeping law that seeks to transform norms entirely.
This point is perhaps best illustrated by America's catastrophic experience with the prohibition
of alcohol. By contrast, less drastic laws aimed at regulating norms, such as restrictions on
Sunday purchases or advertising restrictions, may actually be more successful at curbing the
consumption of alcohol.
229. Lessig, supra note 174, at 1030-31 (citations omitted).
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In order to strengthen carpooling norms it may make more sense to label solo driving
a financially wasteful activity, rather than an environmentally insensitive activity, at
least for the time being.
In any event, many federal and local government officials have pushed for HOV
and HOT lanes out of a belief that a significant number of motorists would be made
better offby carpooling, and yet refuse to do so. These motorists may be adhering to
what Eric Posner might describe as an "inefficient norm."' Indeed, even among
carpoolers, inefficiencies abound. For example, San Diego's Ride-Link program,
which seeks to assist drivers wishing to form carpools, has not been terribly
successful?23'
An even clearer inefficiency is brought to light by contrasting San Diego's
carpooling norms with the norms that prevail in the suburbs around Washington D.C.
For many years, solo motorists commuting to or from Virginia and Maryland have
utilized carpool lanes by picking up fellow commuters, dubbed "slugs," who park
their cars and wait for rides at pre-designated spots along the interstate.1 2 Slugs and
drivers alike benefit from a quicker commute, and slugs save on gasoline and
automobile depreciation costs. Perhaps most importantly, the significant transaction
costs of organizing a carpool 3 are reduced: Carpools need not be planned ahead of
time and motorists need not spend time searching for suitable carpool matches. By
comparison, a vibrant network of "slugs" has not emerged in San Diego"4 despite the
significant cost savings that ExpressPass users could realize by engaging in informal
ride sharing. In Washington D.C., slugging has arisen naturally, without government
intervention. But a slugging norm could also arise as a result of governmental efforts
to encourage it: San Diego might set up designated parking lots and pick-up spots,
and engage in direct advertising to encourage slugging. It might give municipal
employees cash incentives to become the "slug vanguard," so that other motors see
how much time and/or money they are saving, and gradually warm to the idea of
slugging. While San Diego might well realize more success in encouraging these
ventures as a supplement to FasTrak, the ExpressPass program still can be seen as a
more subtle effort to "diminish the influence of inefficient [solo-commuting] norms

230. Posner, supranote 215, at 1697; see also Robert D. Cooter, DecentralizedLawfor a
Complex Economy: The StructuralApproach to Adjudicatingthe New Law Merchant, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 1643, 1684 (1996) ("Sometimes, however, social norms fail to emerge where
needed, or the wrong norms emerge relative to the standards of efficiency and fairness."); Jon
Elster, Norms ofRevenge, 100 ETHIcs 862 (1990) (noting that norms relating to pride and
shame can spark socially destructive feuding); Robert Sugden, ContractarianismandNorms,
100 ETHICS 768, 779-82 (1990) (using the example of nonegalitarian gender norms to show
that inefficient norms can persist). But cf Ullmann-Margalit, supra note 219, at 765 ("When
a social institution or norm is perceived to be less rational than some feasible alternative,
pressures for alteration may be expected to develop.").
231. Telephone Interview with Jay Gainer, supra note 132.
232. See Paik, supranote 35 (explaining the slugging process). Conversations with Kenneth
Heath, a former Pentagon employee, greatly contributed to my understanding of slugging.
233. See supratext accompanying note 26.
234. Telephone Interview with Jay Gainer, supra note 132.
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by enacting laws that give parties incentives to violate them." 5
FasTrak has been designed to affect norms in another way as well. The idea is not
simply to undermine the norm of solo commuting, but also to attach a greater social
sanction to unauthorized uses of the Express Lanes. Earlier I discussed ways in which
FasTrak may be doing just that. 6 That analysis concluded that Express Lanes
cheating had become less socially acceptable because (1) it was seen as undermining
a popular program, (2) the cheaters themselves appeared to be making foolish
decisions, and (3) FasTrak created lawful alternatives to cheating or getting stuck in
traffic. It also suggested that the fact that cheating had become less frequent made it
less acceptable, and therefore less frequent still. The norms literature suggests that the
solidification of the anti-cheating norm might ultimately engender still higher levels
of compliance with the law even if law enforcement scales back the resources it
currently devotes to policing the Express Lanes. 7
As a threshold matter, it is very important to emphasize that many people will
instinctively prefer complying with a new law over breaking it, provided they are
informed of its provisions. 8 In this instance, San Diego's roadway signage makes
drivers aware of the amount of the fine for violating the law. However, even among
laws regulating behavior by motorists, compliance levels vary greatly. At one
extreme is the speed limit, which is often flouted by the majority of motorists
(assuming road congestion does not constrain speeding). " 9 At the other extreme are
extremely high levels of compliance with foundational driving norms, 2 0 such as the
requirement that motorists drive on the right side of the road.24 ' Somewhere in
between these two poles are mandatory seat-belt laws. In 1983, only fourteen percent
of drivers and less than nine percent of front seat passengers in major urban areas
were wearing seat belts.242 During the 1980s and 1990s a number of states enacted

235. Posner, supra note 215, at 1728.
236. See supra Part III.B.
237. See infra text accompanying notes 249-53.

238. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., How DoesLaw Matter?, I GREEN BAG 2D 265, 272 (1998)
("[M]ost people tend to regard law as having moral force, rather than solely as a cost that they
must take into account in weighing the benefits and disadvantages of alternative courses of
action .... ").As a general rule, it appears that most San Diego drivers clearly do wish to "do
the right thing" by complying with the law. Telephone Interview with Karyn Menpink, supra
note 143..
239. See supratext accompanying notes 54-56.
240. Carol Rose's study of nineteenth-century American roadways reveals that customs,
rather than statutes, were frequently the basis for the most widely followed "rules of the road."
Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHEToRIc
OF OWNERSHIP 105, 125-27 (1994).
241. Indeed, the widespread adherence to this norm is part of what makes lapses in it so

unnerving and riveting to watch. The 1972 movie The FrenchConnectionwas apparently the
first to show a high speed car chase with vehicles travelling directly into oncoming traffic, a
scene that was extremely memorable for those who saw it at the time. In recent years, this kind
of vehicle chase has become rather standard fare in action movies.
242. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., New Seat Belt Defense Issues: The Impact ofAir Bags and
MandatorySeat Belt Use Statutes on the Seat Belt Defense andtheBasis ofDamageReduction
Under the Seat Belt Defense, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1369, 1387-88 (1989).
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laws providing that motorists who did not wear seat belts would be fined. As a result,
compliance rose dramatically, such that a scholar writing just a decade and a half
later
243
could confidently refer to the use of seat belts as a widespread social norm.
The apparent result ofthe San Diego program has been to increase compliance with
the law against lane-cheating, from high to extremely high levels. Prior to the
implementation of FasTrak, San Diego's solo motorists complied with the legal
prohibition on traveling in the HOV lanes at a rate of approximately eighty-five
percent. 244 Within months, compliance rates rose to ninety-seven percent. 24 But it is
not only significant that the compliance rates have reached these impressive levels;
it is also notable that the levels of compliance have remained high throughout the life
of the program.246 By contrast, empirical work on the use of law enforcement
measures to combat drunken driving shows that a sudden, highly publicized increase
in enforcement activity deterred a great deal of drunken driving in the early days of
the crackdown, but that the rates of violation subsequently increased after publicity
attached to the crackdowns waned, despite the fact that the level of enforcement
remained constant.247 In San Diego, the maintenance of a relatively strong police
presence on the Express Lanes has hardly grabbed headlines as the program has
matured, but compliance levels have remained very high nevertheless. Thus, it
appears that the rule against Express Lanes cheating is coming to look more like the
norm against driving on the left side of the road, and less like the law against
speeding. 24'
Cass Sunstein has argued that norms may be a more efficient means than actual law
enforcement of prompting individuals to behave in socially desirable ways:

243. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 FrankelLecture:BringingInternationalLawHome,
35 Hous. L. REV. 623, 628 (1998) ("As one moves from grudging, one-time acceptance to
habitual obedience, the rule transforms from external sanction to internal imperative. We
repeatedly observe this evolutionary process in everyday life-whenever we put on bicycle
helmets, snap seat belts, recycle cans, or refrain from smoking."); see also Cheryl Lynn
Daniels, Note, The Seat Belt Defense andNorth Carolina'sNew Mandatory Usage Law, 64
N.C. L. REv. 1127, 1138-39 (1986) (noting that the predicted compliance rates resulting from
mandatory seat belt laws would equal roughly 80% in the United States; that similar laws in
other countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, have boosted seat belt use to 90%;
and that in the immediate aftermath of the passage of such acts, seat belt usage increased by
200 to 300%).
244. See supra text accompanying note 138.
245. See supra text accompanying note 139.
246. The one half of one percent drop in compliance reported by SANDAG during the
program's second year is not statistically significant. See KASCHADE &SUPERNAK, supranote
140, at9.
247. See Richard Lempert, A Resource Theory of the CriminalLaw: Exploring When It
Matters, in How DoEs LAW MATrER? 227,228 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998).

248. Jay Gainer notes that people who are caught using the Express Lanes illegally are likely
to rationalize their behavior as being akin to violating the speed limit. They will tell themselves
that they were running late to an appointment, that they got tied up unexpectedly at work, etc.,
just as they would justify their speeding behavior. Telephone Interview with Jay Gainer, supra
note 132. In a world of congested roadways, Express Lanes cheating may be the equivalent of
speeding. Note, however, that there is no equivalent program for motorists who are willing to
pay a charge in order to violate the speed limit. Should there be one?

1280

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 75:1231

[S]uppose that a community is pervaded by a strong norm against littering. If the
norm is truly pervasive, an important problem of environmental degradation can
be solved without any need for legal intervention. The norm can do what the law
would do at possibly much greater cost. 249
In other words, if FasTrak were to help inculcate a norm of compliance with the laws
governing lane eligibility, then compliance might reach nearly 100% even without
the hawkish watch of the California Highway Patrol. Howard Margolis has argued
that "[u]nder appropriate conditions norms and rules can interact such that the norm
becomes stronger, which makes the rule easier to enforce," eventually causing a
decline in the costs of policing against violations of the rule. 2 0 The initial data from
San Diego indicates that FasTrak presents just such appropriate conditions for this
kind of synergy.
Richard McAdams refers to the development of these pervasive norms as the
process of norm internalization.2"' As a consensus develops within a group or

community that a certain type of behavior is undesirable, the consensus begins to
form a baseline level of expectation. People stop questioning whether and under what
circumstances they should comply with the consensus view. Rather, individuals

simply conform their behavior to the consensus without thinking about it. Eventually,
it becomes clear that a consensus exists and that most members of the community are

no longer questioning its sway.2" 2 At this point the norm has become internalized.
Individuals who violate the norm will experience feelings ofguilt-and these feelings
will deter many from violating it in the first place. 3 In the FasTrak context, it will

249. Sunstein, supra note 205, at 2030; see also Richard H. Pildes, The Destruction of
Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2055, 2073 (1996) (noting that "norms can
allow for widespread participation in enforcement"). Eric Posner articulates a similar point.
[U]nder the norm-transformation approach, the state does not have to continually
expend resources to cause people to engage in the desired pattern of behavior. In
contrast, under the norm-violation approach, the state must engage in constant
rewarding and penalizing. The norm-transformation approach, however, in order
to effect the transformation, may require a large initial investment that exceeds
the continuing costs associated with norm-violation.
Posner, supra note 215, at 1733.
250. Margolis, supranote 45, at 832.
251. See McAdams, supranote 183, at 380-81.
252. See id.at 388. But cf id. ("When the existence of the consensus or the risk of detection
is less than obvious, even a strong consensus may never produce a norm. In particular, those
who do not share the consensus may doubt its existence and thereby remain uninfluenced by
the risk of societal disapproval.").
253. See id. at 381 ("After internalization, there is[]
another cost to violating a norm: guilt.
The individual feels psychological discomfort whether or not others detect her violation."); see
also Elster, supranote 230, at 864 ("In addition to being supported by the attitudes of other
people, norms are also sustained by the feelings of embarrassment, anxiety, guilt, and shame
that a person suffers by the prospect of violating them."); Lempert, supra note 247, at 228
("Indeed, it may not be fear of the law's penalty which mediates the criminal law's impact. In
many cases, particularly involving minor offenses, the implications for personal relations of
being caught-including the anticipated embarrassment-may account for most of law's
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never occur to most solo drivers that they could use the Express Lanes without paying
the toll.' Many ofthose individuals to whom the idea of cheating does occur will be
deterred by doing so because such behavior would simply be "wrong" in their
community. 25
McAdams points out another norms nuance. A norm need not be adhered to
universally. There will always be some members of a community who reject the
norm.2 6 Moreover, some subgroups in society will share norms that directly
contradict dominant community norms. For example, McAdams discusses Christian
Scientist norms that "oppose the use of medical technology that society obligates
parents to use for their children."" 7 In any heterogeneous society, one can expect to
see subgroups that share inconsistent or diametrically opposed norms either agree to
disagree' 8 or do battle to determine whose norms will prevail. 59

impact. Thus, various researchers have reported that for minor crimes like shoplifting or
smoking marijuana, anticipated peer sanctions are more important than legal sanctions as
determinants of behavior."); Lessig, supra note 174, at 997 ("[I]n a well-functioning
community, cheating induces a certain kind of pain in individuals that often (but not always)
suffices to remove the incentive to cheat."); Posner, supra note 215, at 1709 ("We say about
most norms that people bound by them feel an emotional or psychological compulsion to obey
the norms; norms have moral force. The compulsion might be slight or overwhelming; it does
not prevent people from violating a norm, necessarily, but violation does evoke feelings of
shame or guilt."). Of course, given the current anonymity of most Express Lanes violations,
the chance that an offender's apprehension will be observed by peers or superiors is remote.
254. See generally Melvin A. Eisenberg, CorporateLaw andSocialNorms, 99 COLUM. L.

REV. 1253, 1260 (1999) ("[I]t seems likely that most actors who may have internalized an
obligation norm will usually apply the norm [relatively] reflexively, as a natural expression of
their moral and social character, rather than calculatingly, on the basis of a cost-benefit
analysis. Even norms that an actor first adheres to through a self-conscious commitment to
good action will often become habitual second nature through repetition.").
255. Cf id. at 1259 ("Moral norms, in particular, often operate by becoming part of an
actor's moral character, so that some things are 'simply not done'--or simply done-as a result
of the actor's moral sympathies and commitments.") (emphasis omitted).
256. See McAdams, supra note 183, at 379-80 ("Societal norms at least weakly condemn
overt race discrimination, consumption of pornography, and use of marijuana; yet there have
always been some who conspicuously defended these things. Their dissent did not prevent a
norm from arising.").
257. Id. at 386-87.
258. See id. at 388.
259. 1 was surprised to see that this pluralistic notion of a marketplace of norms has not been
well-developed in the literature. Political scientists hold it to be nearly canonical that policies
are made as a result of battles and compromises among particular subgroups of interests. See
generally DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND

PUBLIC OPINION (Alfred A. Knoph, 2d ed. 1971). Truman's pluralist vision is rather
sympathetic to narrow interest groups' influence over policy. For a more hostile analysis of the
role of interest groups at the national political level, see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971). Thus, one would

suspect that theorists seeking to determine how norms are developed would import a similar
vision. It seems intuitive that most societal norms start out as subgroup norms, that the
subgroup (consciously or subconsciously) asserts the attractiveness of its norm to other
subgroups, and that eventually the strongest norms obtain consensus support. As best I can tell,
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This pluralistic conception of norm internalization helps explain the differences
among adherents of the solo-commuting norm, the carpool missionary, and the "I'd
rather be carpooling" norms described earlier in this Article."6 It is not inconsistent
to say that carpoolers already have internalized the norm against cheating26 whereas
some solo drivers have not yet done so. Seen in this light, it is accurate to say that
there is a strong carpooling norm as well as a strong solo-commuting norm, but that
the latter norm has many more adherents, and thus serves as the dominant driving
behavior in San Diego. Through its policies during the last few decades SANDAG
has sided with the minority carpooling norm in an effort to help it weaken the
dominant solo-commuting norm. Similarly, the San Diego community of a few years
ago had a relatively strong anti-cheating norm as applied to carpool lanes and a
minority group whose norms viewed cheating as acceptable. However, because ofthe
collective action problems that sometimes deterred majority norm adherents from
taking costly steps to sanction those who rejected that norm,262 it fell upon the state
to enforce the norm via law enforcement. As a means of decreasing the need for
formal law enforcement, the government created a new constituency of citizens who
felt very strongly that the norm against cheating should not be violated (ExpressPass
users). These users did not want to look like "suckers" who had paid to use the
Express Lanes if other solo commuters were going to break the law and use these
lanes at no cost.263 In so doing, the government drew upon people who had formerly
adhered to the majority norm-those who complied with the law and rode in the slow
lanes-and those who had formerly adhered to the minority norm-those who
illegally used the HOV lanes, but preferred to avoid the cost and stress associated
with breaking the law. The fact that the program "converted" this latter group may
help explain the dramatic increase in compliance. This strategy of splintering the
minority norm adherents may be a successful paradigm for governmental efforts to
inculcate norms of legal compliance.
It remains to be seen to what extent these effects, which apparently do play out in
some close-knit communities, will play out on the roads of San Diego. Has the norm
of compliance become sufficiently internalized in the minds of motorists that a

the closest any scholar has come to presenting a pluralistic conception of norms is in Howard
Margolis's incisive scholarship. See, e.g., Margolis, supra note 45, at 830-31. Dan Kahan
presents another perceptive account, which touches upon the striking differences between
dominant societal norms and the norms prevalent in inner-city communities with respect to the
legitimacy of the war on drugs. See Kahan,supra note 187, at 1861. Finally, implicit in the
discussion of "tipping" and "critical mass" contained in Melvin Eisenberg's recent article is
an understanding that groups may adhere to conflicting norms, and that a sudden shift by a few
important individuals can cause a cascade of others to follow suit, thereby altering the
dominant norm. See Eisenberg, supranote 254, at 1264.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 42-56.
261. Cf GODBE RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, supra note 37, at 12 (noting that HOV users of
FasTrak, unlike other motorists, were generally unaware of the amount of the fine assessed
against those who unlawfully use the Express Lanes).
262. Cf McAdams, supra note 183, at 354 ("[W]hen an effective sanction requires the
action of many individuals, each one reasons that her sanctioningnl will neither make nor break
the norm, so she is better off not bearing sanctioning costs.").
263. See supranote 147.
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consistently diminished CHP presence in the lanes would make little difference for
compliance rates? It seems that the answers might prove elusive, since the anticipated
shift to fully automated enforcement may drastically alter both the likelihood of
violators being caught and the level of social sanction applied to those who are
apprehended. Will the same feelings of guilt spur compliance when anonymity is
preserved? The San Diego data collected so far does not provide a definitive answer,
but the outcome seems to depend on the perceived importance of the law's goals to
those who violate it. Hence clearly defined goals and organized marketing campaigns
may be crucial to governmental efforts to influence norms in loose-knit communities.
Does conformist pressure operate to the same degree in a loose-knit community as
in a close-knit community with respect to the snowballing effect of increased
compliance? The San Diego study suggests a tentative affirmative answer, as
evidenced by the high levels of compliance and increase in tattling behavior by
ExpressPass holders through the life of the program. In any event, several of the
normative insights developed with the paradigm of the close-knit community in mind
do seem, at first glance, helpful in explaining driving behavior on urban roadways.
But more research and theorizing is needed if these conclusions are to be solidified.
Norms theorists have also explored the function of aspirational laws and their
symbolic effects on norms. Recall that an earlier discussion posited that many solo
commuters who refuse to carpool nevertheless wish more people carpooled.2 6 Such
behavior can be understood by reference to the symbolic function of the FasTrak law
in representing what the community would like itself to be, as opposed to what the
community actually is. 265 FasTrak provides some support for the notion that the solocommuting citizens of San Diego do hope to live in a community in which a higher
percentage of motorists carpooled.? Establishing HOV or HOT lanes is a relatively
inexpensive way for residents to express their aspirations.
These issues properly flagged, this Part has so far neglected what is probably the
most interesting aspect of the FasTrak program from a social norms perspective. The
transition from HOV lanes to HOT lanes can be thought of as a shift from a regime
of prohibitions and fines to a regime of choices and charges. How so? Recall that solo
drivers have always had the option of using the Express Lanes. Under the old regime,
exercising this option entailed breaking the law and risking a criminal fine. Under the
new regime, exercising that option entails abiding by the law and paying a toll.267
What are the implications of this shift from fines to tolls? That issue will be

264. See supratext accompanying note 46.
265. See Regan, supra note 238, at 275 ("Law can provide.., a vision that may be
unrealizable, but which sets a direction and offers a basis for criticizing actual behavior. The
fact that we cannot always live up to our aspirations does not mean that law should abandon
the attempt to express them."); Sunstein, supra note 205, at 2026 ("[S]ometimes people
support a law, not because of its effect[ on norms, but because they believe that it is
intrinsically valuable for the relevant 'statement' to be made. And sometimes law will have
little or no effect on social norms.").
266. For example, recall that those polled would prefer to see ExpressPass toll prices rise,
as opposed to an increase in the number of passengers required for a vehicle to count as an
HOV vehicle. See supra note 182.
267. Admittedly, some motorists under the new regime opt for the old regime system of
lawbreaking. But that topic has received enough attention in the Article.
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considered next.
B. FasTrakand the TradablePermits Debate

Perhaps no policy design issue has captured as much attention from environmental
policy scholars in recent years as the debate over tradable emissions credits. 268 Under
a tradable emissions permit scheme, the government ceases regulating how much
pollution each firm can emit or what pollution-control technologies a firm must use.
Instead, the government sets an aggregate limit to the amount ofpollution that can be
emitted, creates permits that allow the holders to emit some predetermined percentage
of that total limit, distributes the permits, and then allows firms to trade permits. By
this means the reductions in emissions will be made by those firms able to do so at
269
the lowest cost.

In recent years, emissions trading systems have been tried at the state level, 270 and

268. See, e.g., BARRY C. FIELD, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 253 (1994) ("In recent years
the idea of transferable discharge permits has become quite popular among some
environmental policy advocates, as well as among policy-makers themselves."); Carol M.
Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls:Management Strategiesfor Common Resources,

1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 27 ("The... pollution rights approach has now become quite b la mode,
and it plays an increasing role in our environmental law."). A comprehensive string-cite would
congest this footnote unduly. For the classic discussions, see J.H. DALES, POLLUTION,

PROPERTY &PRICES 93-97 (1968), and Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
EnvironmentalLaw, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985). More recent treatments include David M.
Driesen, Is Emissions Tradingan Economic Incentive Program?Replacing the Command and
Control/EconomicIncentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289 (1998); Vivien Foster
& Robert W. Hahn, Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons from Los Angeles Smog
Control, 38 J.L. & EcoN. 19 (1995); Perry S. Goldschein, GoingMobile: Emissions Trading
Gets a Boostfrom Mobile Source Emission Reduction Credits, 13 UCLAJ. ENvTL. L. &POL'Y
225 (1994-95); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An
Analysis of EPA's Emmissions Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989); Lisa
Heinzerling, SellingPollution,ForcingDemocracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300 (1995); James
L. Huffman, Markets, Regulation, and Environmental Protection, 55 MONT. L. REv. 425
(1994); James E. Krier, Marketable PollutionAllowances, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 449 (1994);
Daniel P. Selmi, Experimentationand the "New" EnvironmentalLaw, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1061 (1994); Jonathan Baert Weiner, GlobalEnvironmentalRegulation: InstrumentChoice
in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677 (1999). For efforts to extend the model beyond air
pollution, see, for example, RIGHTS BASED FISHING (Philip A. Neher qt al. eds., 1988); Robert
I. Fassbender, Reducing GreatLakes Toxics: Can We Do MoreforLess Through Wastewater
Effluent Trading?,I WIs. ENVTL. L.J. 57 (1994); Norman Marcus,AirRights Transfers inNew
York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 372 (1971); David Sohn & Madeline Cohen, Note,
From Smokestacks to Species: Extending the TradablePermitApproachfrom Air Pollution
to HabitatConservation, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 405 (1996).
269. See Thomas C. Schelling, Prices as Regulatory Instruments, in PERSPECTIVES ON
PROPERTY LAW 532, 542 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
270. See, e.g., South Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., Rules and Regulations 2000-2015
(1993), available in (visited Feb. 8, 2000) <http:/lwww.aqmd.gov/rules/html/tofc20.html>

(rules implementing emissions trading for nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides in southern
California). For an analysis of the rules, see John P. Dwyer, The Use of Market Incentives in
ControllingAirPollution: California'sMarketablePermitsProgram,20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 103
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the federal level,27' and will soon be implemented at the global level.272 But advocates
of tradable permits have often encountered significant resistance based on fears about
what creating a right to pollute would mean. This resistance has taken two forms. The
first is a deontological argument that proceeds as follows: It is simply wrong to create
a right to pollute. Pollution is a bad thing, and the government should not approve of
anyone's efforts to produce it.273 This account ofthe anti-pollution normis, however,
too simplistic to be satisfying. Barring a governmental decision to make something
a zero-threshold (prohibited) substance, some governmental signal of approval
attaches to the emission of a given pollutant. Nor is it accurate to suggest that in the
absence of a trading system, social norms will necessarily dictate that every pollutant
be banned. Obviously, the public is willing to tolerate some level of pollution and is
unwilling to tolerate a higher level. As Eric Posner writes: "[T]here is a general norm
not to pollute 'too much.' Firms are entitled to pollute a bit, especially when they
employ a lot of people and produce valuable goods. But if firms exceed a certain
threshold ofpollution, neighbors complain, consumers boycott, and so on."'274 To the
extent that there are variations in tolerance for marginal units of pollution, that will

(1993).
271. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 401, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (1994). The
Act set up a system of trading credits for sulfur dioxide emissions. See also James Dao, Some
Regions Fearthe PriceAs PollutionRights Are Sold, N.Y. TIMES (late edition), Feb. 6, 1993,

at A-1.
272. For an analysis of the Kyoto Protocol, which seeks to set up a global regime for the
trading of greenhouse gas emissions permits, see Margaret Kriz, Chillingout, 29 NAT'LJ. 866,
866 (1997).
273. See, e.g., STEVEN KELMAN, WHAT PRICE INCENTIVES? ECONOMISTS AND THE
ENvIRONMENT 27-28 (1981); Dwyer, supra note 270, at 111 (stating that some environmental
groups claim that "creating property rights in pollution is morally wrong."); Huffinan, supra
note 268, at432 ("Most environmental groups have opposed the tradeable emissions approach,
generally on the ground that no one should have a right to pollute."); Rose, supra note 268, at
29 ("The complaint is that [tradable permit] systems permit some people to pollute if they pay
enough, whereas in principle, everyone should be doing all he can not to pollute. The argument
seems to have a certain intuitive force . . . ."); James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek,
InstitutionalGuidelinesforDesigningSuccessfulTransferableRightsPrograms,6 YALEJ. ON

REG. 369, 370 (1989) ("[Many environmentalists] oppose credit exchange mechanisms, which
implicitly recognize rights to release pollutants into the environment, based on a belief that
harming the natural environment is wrong under any circumstances, and that putting a price
on environmental issues cheapens them by making them matters of private interest and not
matters of public-spirited societal consensus."); Norman W. Spaulding III, Note,
Commodification and Its Discontents: Environmentalism and the Promise of Market

Incentives, 16 STAN. ENVTL L.J. 293, 322 (1997) ("The significance of the statement that no
one ought to have a market-transferable right to pollute is simply that it attempts to draw a line
between conduct properly relegated to the whims of the marketplace and conduct properly
controlled by other means. The moral consequences of erasing this line is something
environmentalists must consider.").
274. Posner, supra note 215, at 1735; see also Rose, supra note 268, at 7 ("Most people are
willing to put up with some level of air pollution, because we think we need to do so for our
transportation and electricity, among other things, which in themselves may be more important
to our health and well-being than the next increment of clean air.").
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depend on the aggregate level of emissions permitted by the government, and there
is no reason to believe that aggregate levels will be higher under an emissions trading
scheme than under a command-and-control or best-available-technology ("BAT')
system. 27"
A second argument against tradable emissions systems expresses misgivings about
the effect that creating a right to pollute will have on anti-pollution norms. Cass
Sunstein summarizes this view:
Critics claim that emissions trading has damaging effects on social norms by
making environmental amenities seem like any other commodity: a good that has
[a] price, to be set through market mechanisms. Thus they suggest that emissions
trading systems may have damaging effects on social norms by making people see
the environment as something without special claims to public protection.276
Pollution itself no longer becomes the bad act; it is only pollution without the
requisite investment in pollution permits that prompts government punishment. The
ability of a finm to emit pollutants is virtually unlimited, provided that the firm is
willing to pay the costs of doing so.' If the permits themselves succeed in removing
the stigma from pollution, they may well succeed in removing the stigma from
polluters.278 The state-created permit operates as the state's stamp of approval for
polluting and polluters.
This stamp of approval may erode the moral sanction that currently reduces
pollution below the levels that would prevail in the absence of a sanction.279
According to that logic, slapping able-bodied individuals who park in spots reserved

275. BAT schemes require each firm to purchase and employ the best available pollutioncontrol technologies. A BAT scheme is a type of command-and-control regime.
276. Sunstein, supranote 205, at 2045-46; see also Rose, supra note 268, at 34 (noting that
the norm-based critique is the basis of BAT advocates' "most fervent attack" on tradable
emissions rights systems, and that tradable rights regimes lose BAT's "moral thrust by
surrounding pollution with rights-talk, by using a rhetoric of entitlement to pollute. When we
reconceptualize the use of common resources as individual property rights, we attenuate the
moral rhetoric ofcontribution and trying harder for the common good."); Spaulding, supranote
273, at 323 ("Environmental values are subordinated to the marketplace in pollution trading,
thus where compliance is not cost-effective, cheating may still occur."). Of course, the ironic
thing about Spaulding's statement is that the pre-FasTrak HOV-onlyprogram, where fully 15%
of all vehicles were cheating, demonstrates that a noncommodified regime may produce much
lower compliance than a commodified one.
277. Of course, since the number of permits is limited, no firm (or collection of firms) can
emit more than the aggregate emissions total set by the government.
278. See Tripp & Dudek, supra note 273, at 370 ("A less extreme variation on this theme
is the view that polluters should be stigmatized and should not be given permits or licenses to
discharge emissions.").
279. Michael Sandel's editorial articulates this point of view:
[T]uming pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold removes the moral
stigma that is properly associated with it. If a company or a country is fined for
spewing excessive pollutants into the air, the community conveys its judgment
that the polluter has done something wrong. A fee, on the other hand, makes
pollution just another cost of doing business, like wages, benefits, and rent.

Sandel, supra note 6, at A23.
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for the disabled with a $100 fine sends a very different symbolic message from a
system where anyone can buy a premium parking spot for $100, but disabled persons
get free access to the premium spots. 2 0 The former signals that parking by ablebodied people, in such spaces is stigmatized, whereas the latter casts it as a morally
neutral activity. If pollution is not viewed as a "bad" act because of the creation of
pollution permits, one could expect to see less whistle-blowing, less self-restraint
exercised by polluting firms, and fewer private enforcement efforts. 28' As a result, one
might expect to see pollution levels rise as a result of the erosion of an anti-pollution
28 2
norm.
By and large, the response of emissions trading advocates to this line of argument
has been to ignore it. Where they do confront the norms-based critique, emissions
trading advocates have preferred to argue that whatever effect emissions trading has
on norms, its efficiency advantages still make it a superior method of controlling
pollution to command-and-control regimes. 2 3 In other words, the only moral

280. See id.
281. See PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW, supra note 269, at 546 ("Schelling points out
that much environmental protection arises informally, from social practices like good manners
and civility. If pricing schemes-unlike fines or prohibitions-treat pollution as morally
neutral, might they undermine the moral underpinnings of these social practices and hence end
up costing more?"); Weiner, supra note 268, at 724 ("These critics worry that condoning the
purchase and sale of the 'right to pollute' fails to condemn the actor who causes increased
pollution and thereby undermines the ethical norms that motivate environmental protection and
boost compliance with environmental laws and regulations."). Carol Rose cogently ties
together the utilitarian and deontological strains of this argument:
[T]he adoption of sophisticated [tradable permit] techniques, without attention to
their rhetorical message, may come at the price of a diminution in a certain
element of moral suasion. In turn, this moral diminution may work against the
overall effectiveness of [the permit framework] by creating a cultural climate in
which one is not expected to do the right thing unless it is in one's direct interest
to do so.
Rose, supra note 268, at 34.
282. Unfortunately, to my knowledge, no one has conducted an empirical test or even
analyzed polling data in a way that would shed light on whether this predicted effect
materializes when society adopts an emissions trading regime.
283. In his recent article, Jonathan Wiener devotes a few paragraphs to the norm-erosion
thesis. See Weiner, supra note 268, at 724. He notes that a BAT regime grants an unlimited
right to pollute once the firm has implemented the requisite technology, and that its claim to
sending a clear message about pollution's evils is thus dubious. See id. at 725. He also notes
that a "source that emits in excess of its allowances.. . would not only have to pay financial
penalties but would also be subject to public shame and moral stigma for its theft of the
community's shared environmental resource." Id. at 725 n.182. But Weiner ultimately
foresakes these interesting threads and falls back on the "emissions trading is more efficient
and therefore better" mantra. He points out that eschewing a tradable permits regime as
immoral is itself morally insensitive to the real economic concerns of those who would benefit
from a more efficient approach to regulation. See id. at 725. He concludes by writing:
"Whatever the resolution of this debate, the moral case against incentives is far from ironclad.
Given the substantial advantages of incentives for global environmental protection on other
grounds discussed above, it is difficult to see the hard-line moral case against incentives
winning the day." Id. at 726.
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imperative is to ensure that society mitigates pollution in the most efficient means
possible, so4 that resources spent on environmental (and other objectives) do not go
to waste.

28

As Michael Sandel correctly observed in a passage I quoted at the outset, regimes
like FasTrak present an excellent opportunity to study the ways in which transitioning
from command-and-control regimes to transferable permit regimes influence
norms.8 5 Although there are some differences between emissions trading and selling
access to the carpool lanes,"' there is little reason to think that these differences will
alter the ways in which the respective programs influence social norms. Admittedly,
the norm against solo commuting is weaker than the norm against polluting. 7 That
said, as with pollution, the public does not perceive there being a problem with solodriving in moderation, or solo-driving by a moderate number of people. Rather, it is
only when too much pollution/solo driving exists that engaging in the activity is
contrary to social norms.2 1 Moreover, in contrast to the Clear Air Act's emissions
trading provisions, and the emissions trading framework established by the Kyoto
Protocol, the FasTrak program is highly visible and, within its first year of operation,
had become well-known among San Diego commuters. 2 9 A serious difficulty in
studying the effect of law on social norms-ignorance ofthe law-is thus eliminated

284. See, e.g., Paul R. Portney, Counting the Cost: The Growing Role of Economics in
EnvironmentalDecisionmaking,ENV'T, Mar. 1998, at 14, 37.
285. See supra text accompanying note 6.
286. One distinction worth particular attention is the potential for behavioral differences
among different types of actors. For example, emissions trading schemes generally involve
firms as the primary actors. But Sandel is discussing the Kyoto Protocol, where the primary
actors are nations. See supratext accompanying note 6. In FasTrak, the relevant actors are all
individuals. There will be some obvious differences in the ways that norms affect these
different types of actors. But a few similarities are also worth bearing in mind. All three types
of actors will be concerned about their reputations. Individuals want status, firms want
investment capital, and nations want political capital in the world community. Similarly, in the
pollution context, even though the nations and firms are repeat players, some of the anonymity
problems that arise on the San Diego highways loom large. It is often difficult to track the
source of illegal pollution to its source facility or even source nation shortly after it has been
emitted.
An important distinction concerns the fact that the right for solo drivers to use the Express
Lanes is not, at present, alienable. The analysis herein, however, suggests that this lack of
alienability makes little difference with respect to norms. Indeed, if anything, making access
to the Express Lanes alienable might make carpoolers feel that their activities are valued by
the state to an even greater degree, since they could then opt for either time or monetary
savings as a result of their carpooling choice.
287. But cf Posner, supra note 215, at 1734-35.
There seems to be a weak norm against polluting the air-weak in the sense that
most people think that air pollution is undesirable, but nonlegal sanctions do not
suffice to deter it.... Norm-transformation in this context seems unlikely to be
effective. No amount of education and government-sponsored television
commercials are going to prevent paper mills from spewing forth pollution.
Id.
288. See supra text accompanying note 274.
289. See supra text accompanying note 113.
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in this case study.
San Diego's experience under FasTrak shows that emissions trading advocates can
make far more persuasive responses to the normative critique than those that have
been offered so far. The FasTrak experience does not support the argument that a
move from a legal regime prohibiting an undesirable activity to one that commodifies
the activity will undermine the norm against that behavior. San Diego's increase in
carpooling during the life of the program suggests that, if anything, the norm against
solo commuting has become somewhat stronger. Carpoolers have not felt that by
commodifying their contribution to diminished roadway congestion FasTrak has
trivialized their activities. To the contrary, it appears that those drivers who carpooled
before the FasTrak program began to feel that society was providing them with a
greater reward than it did beforehand. Similarly, one might expect that firms that had
voluntarily adopted low-emissions production techniques would become more likely
to pursue further improvements after a financial incentive (via the competitiveness
benefits of not having to purchase permits) is factored into the equation.
The San Diego experience with dramatically lowered violation rates is also
instructive. Recall that FasTrak opened up new options for commuters, thereby
making defiance of the law seem less noble.29 Similarly, polluters who violate the
law of a command-and-control regime would be able to tap into a well of popular
sentiment against the bureaucratic complexity entailed in compliance with
environmental regulations. When a polluting firn can credibly claim that the
governing rules are so confusing as to preclude compliance with them, behavior that
would otherwise be viewed as socially offensive might well be excused, or at least
"
tolerated, by the public.29
' On the other hand, if emissions are governed by a
relatively straightforward market, then when a firm emits more pollution than it has
purchased the rights to emit, the popular norm against cheating might prompt the kind
of widespread92 disapproval likely to lead to whistle-blowing and private
enforcement.
Advocates of emissions trading have argued that a tradable permit scheme will
prompt greater enforcement on the part ofpermit holders. These permit owners would
have a strong incentive to support vigorous enforcement by the state "in order to
ensure that cheating by others does not depreciate the value of the permit holders'
'
investments."29
Indeed, those firms planning to sell emissions trading credits will be

290. See supratext accompanying note 190.
291. Cf Richard B. Stewart, Regulation in a LiberalState: The Role of Non-Commodity
Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537,1579 (1983) (discussing the unpopularity of certain command-andcontrol provisions of the Clean Air Act).
292. To some extent this argument assumes a rather transparent trading system where firm
employees and members of the public can become aware of both the firm's emissions and the
number of permits the firm holds at a relatively small cost. If these numbers are not easily
available, then the norm against theft will be less valuable ex ante because the public will not
perceive theft as occurring. On the other hand, when the government does catch a firm emitting
too much, law enforcement efforts to publicize the "theft" will presumably strike a nerve with
the public. The fear of this possibility may well deter firms from exceeding their permitted
emission levels. See Weiner, supra note 268, at 725 n.182.
293. Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, ReformingEnvironmentalLaw, 13 COLUM.
J.ENvTL L. 171, 183 (1988); see also FIELD, supra note 268, at 258.
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particularly likely to press for strict enforcement, lest the market for their credits (and
hence the firm's profits) be diminished. Advocates of emissions trading believe that
this private enforcement will supplement governmental enforcement of the permit
system, leading to higher overall rates of compliance. 2'
San Diego's experience under FasTrak has demonstrated that a similar
phenomenon has occurred there. The motorists most likely to engage in private
enforcement efforts are not carpoolers, but ExpressPass users.29 Although the San
Diego government has not taken steps to encourage private enforcement, 2 6voluntary
enforcement of this type has been helpful, and potentially could be of significant
assistance to the program in deterring noncompliance and apprehending Express
Lanes cheaters.
Sandel has put forth a final norm-related argument against using tradable permit
schemes to control emissions. He asserts that emissions trading may undermine the
ability of the relevant community to deal with common problems through a regime
of shared sacrifice. 2" Instead of forcing all members ofa community, firms,or nations
to sacrifice in order to reduce pollution, emissions trading allows relatively wealthy
actors to forego making reductions if they are willing to pay the less wealthy actors
to make reductions for them. 98 Of course, richer actors are sacrificing some of their
wealth in order to avoid having to make reductions, but Sandel sees this monetary
sacrifice as somehow insufficient to prevent those who are making the sacrifices
themselves from resenting their wealthier counterparts. Eventually, this resentment
will undermine the citizenry's commitment to pursuing the goal that the shared
sacrifice furthers.2 What's more, the fact that these wealthy actors can afford to

When, and if,some sources emit more than they have permits for, they are
essentially cheating by not buying sufficient permits to cover all of their
emissions. In effect this reduces the demand for permits below what it
otherwise would be. And this had the effect of lowering the market price
of permits. This clearly works against the interest of any firm holding
large numbers of permits, which gives it an incentive to see that other
firms don't cheat on emissions.
Id.
294. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 293, at 183.
295. See supra text accompanying note 147.
296. See supra text accompanying note 150.
297. See Sandel, supra note 6, at A23; see also L.D. Danny Harvey & Elizabeth J. Bush,
JointImplementation:An Effective StrategyforGlobal Warming?, ENv'T, Oct. 8, 1997, at 14,
39 (discussing the same point).
298. See Sandel, supra note 6, at A23 ("[The United States would have more [moral]
suasion if these developing countries could not rightly complain that trading in emissions
allows wealthy nations to buy their way out of global obligations."). This theme of shared
sacrifice appears throughout the work of other communitarians. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER,
SPHERES OF JUsTICE 168 (1983) (noting that a strong community requires that "all of us, in
different ways and on different occasions, have to be available" to perform unpleasant work
for the benefit of the public).
299. It is worth noting that the early evidence from the Kyoto Protocol, the emissions
trading scheme that Sandel is criticizing, does not lend support to his hypothesis. In fact, the
opposite appears to be occurring. After initial skepticism, the developing nations are embracing
emissions permit trading as a means of bringing badly needed capital to the developing world.
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continue emitting becomes a status symbol in and of itself-the smokestack is
transformed from a nuisance into an emblem of power and wealth.
Data from the ExpressPass program seems to undermine this shared-sacrifice
critique of tradable permit systems. The egalitarian critique of the program has not
been salient, and expressions of resentment by lower-income residents have been
limited."° The consensus among San Diego's population that the program treats the
city's commuters fairly suggests that residents believe the regime is one of shared
sacrifice-motorists can just choose whether they would prefer to sacrifice money or
time. Nor has driving in the Express Lanes become a clear "vehicle" for the arrogant
flaunting of wealth-as demonstrated by the sense of embarrassment expressed by
some motorists using the lanes.30' Finally, there is the rather obvious point that, as
with emissions reductions, the pre-FasTrak status quo was not characterized by a
strong sense of collective responsibility among San Diego's drivers to reduce traffic
congestion. Rather, the typical driver wanted traffic congestion to be addressed in a
way that would involve minimal disruption of her own solo-commuting patterns. In
short, the diminution of ocial capital predicted by Sandel has failed to materialize in
San Diego. As a result, skepticism about Sandel's assessment of emissions trading's
effect on norms of shared sacrifice in dealing with pollution is certainly warranted.
V. CONCLUSION

A. Recap: FasTrak'sMajorLessons
San Diego's FasTrak program has provided an interesting case study in a number
of ways. The program was the first of its kind to merge the carpool lane and
congestion-pricing concepts, and it demonstrated the underlying compatibility of
these two congestion-management schemes. The program's initiation correlated with
increased traffic in the Express Lanes, decreased traffic in the main lanes, and a
significant increase in carpooling levels. The most likely explanation for this increase
in HOVs is that new drivers were attracted to carpooling by a relative monetary
benefit that supplemented preexisting time savings. This point is worth stressing.
Even though carpoolers were not actuallybetter off as a result of the program-just
as before they rode in the Express Lanes for free and got the benefit of a relatively
quick commute-they apparently felt better off, because other drivers were now
paying a fee to do what carpoolers were doing for free. In other words, taking money
out of A's pocket while leaving B alone made B feel richer. As a result, being a B
became a more attractive option, and so a number ofAs decided to become Bs. In the

See Margaret Kriz, After Argentina,49 NAT'L J. 2848,2849 (1998) ("[Ain increasing number
of developing countries are looking at the... emissions-trading proposal[] as a way to solve
their environmental problems while attracting new high-technology investment.").
300. See supranotes 197-200. A word of caution is warranted here. The wealth disparities
among San Diego residents are less severe than those that separate the developed world from
the developing world. Cf Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation:
Lessonsfor the EuropeanUnion andthe InternationalCommunity, 83 VA. L. REV. 1331, 1341
(1997) (noting that the wealth differences among American states are less dramatic than the
differences among nations).
301. See supratext accompanying note 206.
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process, the norm of behavior to which the Bs adhered became more firmly
entrenched. The lesson here is that well-publicized usage fees have real symbolic
significance, both for those who pay them and for those who do not.
The initial San Diego data also shows that the program increased compliance rates
significantly. Unfortunately, enforcement efforts increased noticeably when the
program was initiated, so it is impossible to isolate the enforcement effects of the
program in a vacuum. At the same time, there is rather strong evidence from people
on the ground in San Diego that the program did successfully convert large numbers
of former violators into ExpressPass holders. In the process, the program transformed
a group of former cheaters into individuals most likely to be bothered by cheating.
Moreover, there is some reason to believe that the dramatic observed increase in
compliance levels has helped to create a norm of compliance that will maintain high
levels of lawful use even if police resources are diminished. Finally, the staying
power of the increased compliance levels is particularly noteworthy. Increased
enforcement of traffic laws usually does not lead to sustained increases in
compliance. But in San Diego it has, suggesting that driving norms have been altered.
FasTrak also provides a case study in how legal changes affect norms in a looseknit community of nonrepeat players. In such an environment, the program can be
perceived as a subtle governmental effort to show how individual driving decisions
can create negative externalities for the communities. In the long run, FasTrak might
be an effective first step in undermining dominant solo-driving norms. It also presents
a case study in competing norms, and shows how minority and majority behaviors
can interact and respond to government efforts to endorse the norms adhered to by
the minority.
Another interesting finding of the case study is the limited resonance of equitybased challenges to the quasi-privatization of what had formerly been a common
public resource. This lack of resonance, in an area of the country where toll roads are
uncommon, suggests that in a transportation framework already permeated with
inequality (i.e., the presence of Lexuses), the marginal increase in stratification that
will result when that inequality is expanded will go practically unnoticed.
From a social norms perspective, one of the most interesting aspects ofthe program
was the way in which it appeared to have successfully changed the social meaning of
driving in the Express Lanes without authorization. FasTrak helps make such
behavior appear to be not just wrong, but stupid. The commodification of the road
makes other drivers less sympathetic to cheaters. The Express Lanes violator is
transformed from a rebel into a scofflaw. The potential for the program to boost
compliance by successfully tying programmatic norms to strong existing norms is
significant.
The application of the FasTrak case study to the emissions trading debate has been
fruitful. The case study provides evidence to discount the argument that
commodification of a public good undermines the beneficial social norms that help
protect the good from overexploitation. Indeed, the opposite appears to be true. The
case study also supports the argument that holders of tradable permits will help
ensure greater enforcement of the law than would otherwise be the case. Lastly, the
case study casts some doubt on the communitarian story of public goods provision.
When wealthier members of a community sacrifice dollars and others sacrifice goods
and services, the latter group will not come to resent their sacrifices as somehow
greater than those of the wealthier community members. Rather, the contributions of

2000]

CALIFORNIA'S CARPOOL LANES

1293

all toward the common problem will be recognized, with each member sacrificing
what she can most easily afford to do without.
B. CommodiJfcationPostscript:
Some Foodfor Thought

This Article began with a brief exploration of the dispute over tradable emissions
permits and highlighted the centrality of that controversy in environmental law and
policy. But the underlying issue there, the question of under what circumstances it is
advisable to commodify a public good, is a flashpoint in a number of current
controversies: Should there be a market for human organs?3" For blood?. 3 For
babies? 3" For sexual services?" 5 Similarly, intellectual property scholars are now
struggling with difficult issues about whether certain forms of public property should
be commodified: Should we allow people to patent newly discovered human
genes? 0. What about cDNA sequences? 30 7Manmade transgenic species?0 8 Naturally

302. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 161 (1996); Ann Alpers
&Bernard Lo, CommodificationandCommercializationin Human Embryo Research,6 STAN.
L. & PoL'Y REV. 39 (1995); Mark F. Anderson, The Future of Organ Transplantation:From
Where Will New Donors Come, To Whom Will Their Organs Go?, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 249
(1995).
303. See, e.g., RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO
SOCIAL POLICY (1970); Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and the Blood Supply: An Analysis of Law,
Regulation, and Public Policy, 74 WAsH. U. L.Q. 913, 940-46 (1996); Hamish Stewart,
Rationalityand the Marketfor Human Blood, 19 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 125 (1992); Lisa
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304. See, e.g., RADIN, supranote 302, at 137-40; Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The Economics ofthe Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978); J. Robert S. Prichard, A
Marketfor Babies?, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 341 (1984).
305. See, e.g., DAVID A. J.RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW 84-127 (1982);
Lars 0. Ericsson, ChargesAgainst Prostitution:An Attempt at a PhilosophicalAssessment,
90 ETHICS 335 (1980); Carole Pateman, Defending Prostitution:ChargesAgainst Ericsson,
93 ETHICS 561 (1983).
306. See, e.g., Peter Halewood, Law's Bodies: Disembodimentandthe StructureofLiberal
PropertyRights, 81 IOwA L. REV. 1331, 1348-49 (1996); Andrew Trew, RegulatingLife and
Death: The Modification and Commodification of Nature, 29 U. TOL. L. REV. 271 (1998);
Kara H. Ching, Note, Indigenous Self-Determination in an Age of Genetic Patenting:
Recognizing an EmergingHuman Rights Norm, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 687 (1997).
307. See, e.g., JAMEs BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTIONOFTHE INFORMATION SOCIETY 8-9 (1996); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Intellectual
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308. See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); Elizabeth Joy Hecht, Note,
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occurring substances in the rainforest that may have therapeutic properties? 3" Much
excellent theorizing, but precious little empirical work, has been done to explore the
ramification of commodification on social norms generally. Advocates of
commodification generally may therefore be tempted to extend my findings to these
other areas and the dissimilar public goods involved.
But this Article should not be read as an across-the-board endorsement of
commodification of all public goods. To the contrary, Iwill close by pointing to one
area where, unlike with San Diego's freeways, commodification appears to have
engendered perverse, socially harmful norms. I will use that example to emphasize
that commodification is a poor tool to create certain kinds of norms in certain kinds
of contexts.
During the Civil War years, conscripts on both the Northern and Southern sides
were permitted to avoid military service by paying a "bounty" to able-bodied
replacement soldiers, who would then take their places on the front lines. 31° From an
economics perspective, such a system has intuitive appeal: "[A]rguably those more
able or committed to serving will end up doing so; those to whom the value of
pursuing other ends or obligations is highest, such as heads of families, will remain
available for those pursuits."3" And the initial months of the war saw the burgeoning
of a robust market for replacement soldiers: Prices reached $1500 in some places, an
enormous sum at the time. 2 But the commodification ofmilitary service was quickly
met with a backlash: The public was outraged by the perceived inequities of these
bounties, and voluntary enlistment virtually ceased. Within a few months, both the
North and South revoked the practice of allowing able-bodied men to buy their way
out of military service.
In contemporary America, the practice of people buying their way out of military
service during wartime still strikes most as profoundly immoral. Recall the negative
publicity encountered by vice-presidential candidate Dan Quayle when the public
learned that he had apparently used family connections to avoid combat service in the
Vietnam War.313 The historical prevalence of this norm suggests that, whatever
efficiency advantages might accrue to a society that commodifies military service in
wartime, social norms will not bend in response to such a program. Moreover, many
of the affluent men who violated this egalitarian norm and bought their way out of

309. See, e.g., David R. Downes, New Diplomacyfor the Biodiversity Trade: Biodiversity,
Biotechnology, andIntellectualPropertyin the Convention on BiologicalDiversity,4 TOURo
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1993); Laurie Anne Whitt, IndigenousPeoples, IntellectualProperty&
the New ImperialScience, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv.211 (1998); R. David Simpson & Roger
A. Sedjo, Contractsfor TransferringRights to Indigenous Genetic Resources, RESOURCES,
Fall 1992, at 1.
310. See EuGENE C. MURDOcK, PATRIOTISM LIMITED 1862-1865: THE CIVIL WAR DRAFT
BOUNTY SYSTEM 2 (1967); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienabilityand the Theory of

AND THE

PropertyRights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 967-68 (1985).
311. Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A
Comment on the Symposium, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 936, 944-45 (1991).
312. See id.
313. See Judith Crown, Quayle Tells Vets OpeningsExistedin GuardUnit, Hous. CHRON.,
Aug. 23, 1988, at 1. See generally WALZER, supra note 298, at 169 (arguing that military
service obligations must be spread among the populace on an egalitarian basis).
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military service felt shame and suffered social sanctions as a result. What is it, then,
that separates the draft from the express lanes?
My intuition is that the primary difference between the draft and the highways is
that, in a very visible way, the former involves risk of life and limb in a way that the
latter does not." 4 Conveniences and time savings may be easily commodified."' Life
and death may not.316 Imagine the furor that would erupt in response to a proposal

314. For some readers, another potentially relevant difference may spring to mind: In our
republic, military service is inextricably bound up with democratic values, which are
themselves highly egalitarian. But during peacetime, those on the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum are much more likely to serve, largely as a result of the movement to an all
volunteer force. Yet this status quo does not seem to offend popular norms. It is only when
soldiers begin dying in combat that the tough questions about equality and military service are
asked. Moreover, as the Supreme Court's right-to-travel jurisprudence makes clear, the ability
to travel on the nation's highways has also long been deemed fundamental to a democratic
regime, so I am not convinced that the grafting of democratic norms onto military service or
freeways cuts one way or the other. On the other hand, the receptiveness of San Diego's
population to commodification of the open road may indicate that the free and open road is no
longer as central to our democratic ideals as it was in an earlier era.
315. An interesting counter-example springs to mind: the practice of tipping the mfiitre d'
at a crowded restaurant in order to obtain a table more quickly. Although such behavior is
apparently widespread and usually successful, a significant social sanction appears to attach
to it. When one tips the maitre d', one should evidently do so surreptitiously, so as not to
provoke the ire of other customers who are also waiting for tables. Indeed, some restaurants,
such as New York's trendy "44," prohibit tipping the maitre d' because, in the owner's words,
"otherwise you'd have the miitre d' selling tables." Ask Esky, ESQUIRE, Oct. 1996, at 40.
Custom indeed precludes the auctioning of tables to the highest bidder, but I suspect that
such a custom may soon fall by the wayside. The reason tipping of that sort is still subject to
a social sanction has to do with the unfair nature of the bidding. Most people follow the
unwritten rule and do not tip, and then become aggravated when they see another diner jump
the queue by breaking the rule. If more restaurants were forthright about their table allocation
policies, I suspect that the social sanction against tipping the maitre d' would evaporate. It is
not the concept of paying for a table that we find offensive- everyone recognizes that longtime customers, celebrities, and beautiful people always get better service at restaurants, and
many restaurants are appealing precisely because their exorbitant menu prices successfully keep
out the "riff-raff." Rather, it is the concept of unfair competition, which disadvantages those
who adhere to the dominant norm, that forces the practice of tipping the maitre d' underground.
Furthermore, the tippers must confront (face to face) the nontippers while they wait for tables.
Forcing tippers to endure these uncomfortably guilty moments in the company of nontippers,
however brief, probably discourages tipping. Cf. supra text accompanying note 206. By
contrast, at an auction, where the rules and norms of bidding are clear, proximity does not
breed discomfort and restraint. To the contrary, it may well prompt the kind of fierce,
personalized competition that causes bids to escalate higher than they would ifthe bidders were
not all brought face-to-face.
316. Readers may perceive a similarity between my analysis here and Margaret Jane Radin's
property-and-personhood hypothesis, which is articulated in Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987). Radin argues that commodification is most
tolerable when applied to those forms ofproperty that are least bound up with a person's sense
of self and individual dignity. Indeed, Radin suggests that people's automobiles are weakly
related to their personhood, see id. at 1926, so one could argue that she correctly predicts the
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requiring ambulances or fire-engines to pay a fee in order to ride in the Express
Lanes.3 17 To take a less extreme example, remember that the FasTrak program could
have been marketed as a program that would not only save commuters time, but also
reduce their risk ofbeing involved in a serious traffic accident. Yet the safety benefits
of the program were not featured in FasTrak's marketing materials." 8 Thus, even
where life and death is at issue, rhetorical approaches that deemphasize this aspect of
a commodification program may prevent a backlash. But where, as with wartime
military service, the good is so clearly intertwined with survival that even a clever
rhetorical approach cannot obscure the entry of market forces into life and death
decisions, commodification may well run counter to prevalent social norms. If this
hunch is correct, then it suggests that the trend towards commodification of
environmental resources, public utilities, and the Internet may be aided by receptive
social norms. At the same time, this hypothesis would also help explain the current
popular backlash against the intrusion of market forces into the doctor-patient
relationship, as well as the public's lasting revulsion against the commodification of
babies, human organs, and the biological building blocks of life itself.
Commodification unquestionably has its place: For solo driving and SO2emissions,
attaching a dollar value to the good or activity is an excellent way of prompting
people to take nonmarket activities seriously and to consume in more efficient ways.
But people already take "goods" such as wartime military service and life itself quite
seriously, so commodifying these types of "goods" may well prove to be an
unnecessary, even counterproductive, attention-getting device.

success of San Diego's roadway commodification scheme. As an aside, I take issue with her
characterization-my impression from having lived in Southern California is that here
especially, automobiles are closely wrapped up in the "personhood" of their drivers. See also
supra note 207.
317. Currently, such vehicles have public-safety easements to use whatever roads their
drivers please. Of course, at least in theory, ambulances and fire engines would always qualify
as carpools because they never should be driven solo.
318. See supratext accompanying notes 201-02.

